# National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius > Supreme Court of the United States · June 28, 2012 · 567 U.S. 519 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9501450 ## Case - **Full name:** NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS Et Al. v. SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 28, 2012 - **Citations:** 567 U.S. 519; 132 S. Ct. 2566; 183 L. Ed. 2d 450; 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4876 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Thomas - **Judges:** Roberts, Iii-C, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Elagan, Kagan, Iii-D, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito - **Cited by:** 962 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by United States v. Kenneth Rose, 714 F.3d 362 (2013). - Negative treatments: 2 - Distinguished by: 2 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9501450 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding Article III ripeness because the case concerned a “pre-enforcement facial challenge” to the individual mandate and the fact that “[b]y permitting this lawsuit to be filed three and one-half years before the effective date ... the only thing that changes is that all thr… - holding that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s provision for a “shared responsibility payment” for those *79 failing to comply with the individual mandate to purchase health insurance imposes a “penalty” on those failing to do so for purposes of the Anti-Injunct… - recognizing that Congress has broad authority under the Commerce Clause, not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states, and extending to activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, including activities that do so only when aggregated with si… - stating that “[i]n distinguishing penalties from taxes, this Court has explained that if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission” and that “the shared responsibility payment may for constitutional purposes be considered a tax,… - concluding that Congress had unconstitutionally attempted to “penalize States ... by taking away their existing Medicaid funding,” but then asking “what Congress would have intended in light of the Court’s constitutional holding” (quoting Booker, 543 U.S at 246, 125 S.Ct. 738) ## Opinion text Justice Thomas, dissenting. I dissent for the reasons stated in our joint opinion, but I write separately to say a word about the Commerce Clause. The joint dissent and The Chief Justice correctly apply *708 our precedents to conclude that the Individual Mandate is beyond the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Under those precedents, Congress may regulate “economic activity [that] substantially affects interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 560 (1995). I adhere to my view that “the very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Lopez, supra, at 584-602 (same); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 67-69 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As I have explained, the Court’s continued use of that test “has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.” Morrison, supra, at 627 . The Government’s unprecedented claim in this suit that it may regulate not only economic activity but also inactivity that substantially affects interstate commerce is a case in point. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9501450. Public record. Not legal advice.