# Johnson v. California > Supreme Court of the United States · June 13, 2005 · 545 U.S. 162 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499993 ## Case - **Full name:** Johnson v. California - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 13, 2005 - **Citations:** 545 U.S. 162; 8 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 849; 125 S. Ct. 2410; 162 L. Ed. 2d 129; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4842 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Thomas - **Judges:** Stevens, Breyer, Thomas - **Cited by:** 912 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Commonwealth v. Jones, 597 Pa. 286 (2008). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499993 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding as an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination California's "more likely than not" standard and reversing defendant's conviction because the permissible inferences of discrimination, which caused the… - holding that it violated Batson for a state court to speculate about plausible race-neutral reasons for striking jurors in determining whether the defense had made out a prima facie case under People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), and noting that “[t]he inherent uncerta… - holding that clear and convincing evidence showed that the prosecution’s strikes were racially determined when: no facts other than race could explain the strikes; the prosecution used shuffling and disparate questioning during the selection; the prosecution expressed pretextu… - holding that a prima facie case under Batson had been established when “the inference of discrimination was sufficient to invoke a comment by the trial judge that ‘we are very close,’ and on review, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that ‘it certainly looks suspicious … - finding that the inference of discrimination was raised where the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all three of the prospective African American jurors from a panel of 43 eligible jurors and the prosecutor "had no apparent reason to challenge [a] prospective… ## Opinion text Justice Thomas, dissenting. The Court says that States “have flexibility in formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)],” ante, at 168, but it then tells California how to comply with “the prima facie inquiry mandated by Batson,” ante this page. In Batson itself, this Court disclaimed any intent to instruct state courts on how to implement its holding. 476 U. S., at 99 (“We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a de *174 fendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges”); id., at 99-100, n. 24 . According to Batson , the Equal Protection Clause requires that prosecutors select juries based on factors other than race — not that litigants bear particular burdens of proof or persuasion. Because Batson’s burden-shifting approach is “a prophylactic framework” that polices racially discriminatory jury selection rather than “an independent constitutional command,” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555 (1987), States have “wide discretion, subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult problems of policy,” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U. S. 259, 278 (2000); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 438-439 (2000). California’s procedure falls comfortably within its broad discretion to craft its own rules of criminal procedure, and I therefore respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499993. Public record. Not legal advice.