# Chen Lin-Jian, A/K/A Jian Cheng Lin v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · May 30, 2007 · 489 F.3d 182

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499738

## Case

- **Full name:** Chen LIN-JIAN, A/K/A Jian Cheng Lin, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** May 30, 2007
- **Citations:** 489 F.3d 182; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12448
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Niemeyer
- **Judges:** Niemeyer, Traxler, Shedd
- **Cited by:** 39 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499738

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[t]he requirement that the applicant provide a reasonable explanation for the lack of corroborating evidence presumes that the IJ offers a petitioner an opportunity to explain the absence” and that "Lin ought to have been given an opportunity to authenticate t…
- explaining that despite adverse credibility finding regarding petitioner’s subjective fear of future persecution, IJ made no credibility findings regarding petitioner’s past persecution, and therefore IJ was "essentially silent” on petitioner’s credibility on that issue
- noting that although “[i]nconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony” constitute cogent reasons for an adverse credibility finding, “speculation, conjecture, or an otherwise unsupported personal opinion” do not (internal quotation marks …
- observing that “we will not defer to an adverse credibility finding that is based on speculation, conjecture, or an otherwise unsupported personal opinion” (quoting Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted))
- stating that a spouse “may establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal by demonstrating that his wife was forced to undergo an abortion ...”

## Opinion text

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
With respect to Lin’s request for asylum and withholding of removal, I would affirm the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Judge. Because the Board’s decision was grounded on findings of fact and credibility determinations, we owe it substantial deference, particularly in this area in which the Attorney General is given broad discretion. The INA provides that the Board’s findings of fact “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 , 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812 , 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Moreover, we defer to credibility findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.2006).
I cannot find on this record that the evidence “compels” findings different from those made by the Immigration Judge. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812 (“To reverse the BIA finding, we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it”). Under this deferential standard, we must affirm.
With respect to Lin’s request for relief under the Convention Against Torture, I concur in the majority’s opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499738. Public record. Not legal advice.
