# In Re Thurman Brown, Thurman Brown v. Wilshire Credit Corporation

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · April 26, 2007 · 484 F.3d 1116

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499644

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re Thurman BROWN, Thurman Brown, Appellant, v. Wilshire Credit Corporation, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** April 26, 2007
- **Citations:** 484 F.3d 1116; 362 B.R. 1116; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9462; 2007 WL 1217739
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rymer
- **Judges:** Reinhardt, Rymer, Silverman
- **Cited by:** 27 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499644

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, after the 2002 amendment to the rules, that minute orders can constitute a “separate document” that starts the appeal clock

## Opinion text

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I agree that Brown’s appeal to the district court was timely, though for somewhat different reasons.
Brown argues that the April 22 minute order was not final because it was intertwined with a sanctions motion on which the bankruptcy court had not yet ruled. If so, then the bankruptcy court’s June 30 order regarding sanctions was the final order, its July 6 judgment was the “separate document” required by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9021, and the July 15 appeal was timely under Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8002(a).
Alternatively, if the April 22 order is independent of the sanctions motion, then the question is whether the minute entry was a “document” within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 9021, which incorporates Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. We have held that a minute order denying post-judgment relief constitutes a “document” for purposes of Civil Rule 58 only “if it (1) states that it is an order; (2) is mailed to counsel; (3) is signed by the clerk who prepared it; and (4) is entered on the docket sheet.” Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Beaudry Motor Co. v. Abko Props., Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir.1986)); Carter v. Beverly Hills Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 884 F.2d 1186, 1188-90 (9th Cir.1989). While it is possible that more should be required of a document purporting to set forth summary judgment than of a post-judgment order, certainly we should not require less. This being so, the minute entry here could not trigger the clock for filing an appeal because, at a minimum, it was not mailed to counsel. 1
As the appeal would be timely even if the minute order were final, I wouldn’t venture to guess what more magic words are needed to make an order granting summary judgment a final disposition in bankruptcy than “It is ordered ... granting Wilshire’s motion for summary judgment.” I’d stick with In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304, 305-06 (9th Cir.1990).
. I express no opinion as to whether electronic communication satisfies or renders obsolete the mailing requirement in ACandS, as Wilshire’s contention to this effect is not supported by the record.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499644. Public record. Not legal advice.