# Joseph P. Dyer III v. James Bowlen, Warden

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · August 30, 2006 · 465 F.3d 280

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499271

## Case

- **Full name:** Joseph P. DYER III, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James BOWLEN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 30, 2006
- **Citations:** 465 F.3d 280; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22221; 2006 WL 2482819
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Inrich
- **Judges:** Inrich, Suhrheinrich, Gilman, Rogers
- **Cited by:** 77 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499271

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that although petitioner’s claims were “factually distinguishable from those in Morales and Gamer, the rule of constitutional law pronounced in those cases remains the proper standard by which to measure an ex post facto violation” and applying Gamer to retroactive sta…
- stating that Tennessee Court of Appeal’s holding, that petitioner must show that new parole regulation actually increased his sentence in order to obtain relief, was contrary to clearly established federal law set forth in Gamer
- holding that state court’s rejection of ex post facto claim on the ground that challenged statute was "procedural in nature” was error under AED-PA standard of review
- holding that this court may grant habeas relief under AEDPA only if the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is unreasonable, not simply wrong

## Opinion text

SUHRHE INRICH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the reasoning and result of Judge Gilman’s opinion. I write separately merely to point out the absurdity of postulating that the Tennessee parole board would, could, ever conclude that Dyer’s “release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,” Tenn Code Ann. § 40-8614 (1974); Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a) (1998), or that his release would not “depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the defendant stands convicted.” Tenn Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b) (1998). In 1975, Dyer was convicted in the Criminal Court of Hamilton County of two counts of Murder in the First Degree and sentenced to death by electrocution in each case. Dyer, III v. State, No. 1182, 1991 WL 44978 , at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Apr.4, 1991). In 1977, his death sentences were commuted to life sentences after the mandatory death penalty statute then in effect was declared unconstitutional, id. a fortuitous event from Dyer’s standpoint, unrelated to the nature of his crimes and the State’s judgment of them. In short, in my view, sometimes the technical legal arguments obscure common sense.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499271. Public record. Not legal advice.