# United States v. Gregory Vincent Hunt

> Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · August 9, 2006 · 456 F.3d 1255

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499103

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory Vincent HUNT, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 9, 2006
- **Citations:** 456 F.3d 1255; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20401; 2006 WL 2280243
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Briscoe
- **Judges:** Briscoe, McKay, McConnell
- **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499103

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding, after a lengthy analysis, that “forgery at common law depends on genuineness of execution, and does not extend to an agent’s false assertion of authority to act on behalf of his principal”

## Opinion text

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in Parts I, II.B and III of the majority’s opinion, as well as the judgment. I decline to join Parts II.A and II.C, however, because the unambiguous language of 18 U.S.C. § 513 (a) makes it unnecessary to resort to review of the legislative history or common-law definitions of “forgery.” See generally Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 , 124 S.Ct. 1023 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) (“The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text,” and “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms”); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 , 109 S.Ct. 2818 , 106 L.Ed.2d 76 (1989) (“If congressional intent is unmistakably clear in the language of the statute, reliance on committee reports and floor statements will be unnecessary .... ”).
Where, as here, we are asked to interpret a statute which contains an express definition of the term at issue, our task is made easier. And, as the majority states, “[pjarticularly where Congress has supplied its own statutory definition of a term, *1270 we cannot presume that Congress meant simply to codify the common-law meaning.” Maj. Op. at 1265. Further, “ ‘[w]hen the meaning of the statute is clear, it is both unnecessary and improper to resort to legislative history to divine congressional intent.’ ” United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Edwards v. Valdez, 789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir.1986)).
I am content in this case to rely on the statutory language to determine whether Mr. Hunt committed the crimes charged. When the acts committed by Mr. Hunt are reviewed through that lens, the government has failed to establish the documents at issue here were “forged” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 513 . See Maj. Op. at 1266-1267.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9499103. Public record. Not legal advice.