# Raymond M. Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union James E. Sharp > Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · March 1, 2006 · 439 F.3d 1018 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9498726 ## Case - **Full name:** Raymond M. CORNWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRA CENTRAL CREDIT UNION; James E. Sharp, Defendants-Appellees - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - **Decided:** March 1, 2006 - **Citations:** 439 F.3d 1018; 88 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,426; 97 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 930; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5136; 2006 WL 473845 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Bea - **Judges:** Fisher, Gould, Bea - **Cited by:** 475 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9498726 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that, to establish a prima facie case for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a 19 plaintiff must allege that she: (1) belongs to a class of persons protected by Title VII; 20 (2) performed her job satisfactorily; (3) suffered an adverse emp… - explaining that, to set forth a prima facie claim of discrimination under Title VII, an employee must allege (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she performed her job adequately, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) she was treated differently than … - stating that “[the] [pjlaintiff must accept the consequence of his choice not to pursue discovery of [the witness’s] testimony before the discovery cutoff[,] ... [because his attorney] surely knew or should have known that [the] [defendants’ motions for summary judgment would … - stating that, on a motion for summary judgment, once a defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory act, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the plaintiff must offer evidence that the reason is a pretext for discrimination - explaining the burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and noting that a plaintiff cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by “relying solely on the plaintiffs subjective belief’ ## Opinion text BEA, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur separately as to Part IILAl/of the opinion 1 because I think the evidence of Sharp’s immediate reaction to Corn-well’s enquiry — an offer to find Cornwell employment elsewhere — can reasonably be seen as contradictory to Sharp’s assertion he wanted to have Cornwell remain with the company and be in charge of lending. Hence, the trier of fact can view Sharp’s business related reason for re-assigning Cornwell as a pretext, and can then consider racial animus as the true motivation of Cornwell’s reassignment or demotion. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097 . I respectfully disagree with the majority as to the effect of the other evidence it cites as a basis for a finding of pretext or racial animus. Taken alone or together with the evidence of Sharp’s said immediate reaction, the fact that (1) Cornwell was a valued employee- of Electra who knew the most about lending, 2 (2) was the only *1037 African-American executive, (3) was the only executive demoted, or (4) was kept out of meetings where his demotion was discussed does not undermine Sharp’s evidence that Sharp wanted to limit Cornwell to lending. Absent some claim of earlier racial discrimination, 3 the fact that Corn-well is the sole African-American and the sole executive to be demoted provides no evidence that he was demoted because of his race. Were Cornwell to have been the sole executive promoted, would it lead to the conclusion he was being preferred because of his race? One must distinguish between coincidence and causal effect. To think otherwise would tend to insulate Cornwell from adverse action, or explain his advance, solely because of his race. Similarly, because a person about to be reassigned or demoted is not consulted before the determination is made does not suggest that the reassignment or demotion is being made because of racial animus, dressed up in pretextual reasons. Suppose he were the sole executive promoted, without a prior interview. Would it be evidence that he was promoted because of his race? When it is unnecessary to grant probative effect to certain evidence, it is necessary not to do so, lest in another case it be cited back to us. . I join in the remainder the opinion's analysis. . If anything, this evidence supports Sharp’s proffered rationale that he demoted Cornwell so Cornwell could lead exclusively the lending department. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1195 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1195 (2006) (per curiam), is inapposite to Corn-well’s situation. Sharp did not proffer evidence that he demoted Cornwell because Cornwell had performance problems, or that Cornwell’s replacement was better qualified. *1037 See id. at-, 126 S.Ct. 1195 (stating that part of the employer’s defense to claims of disparate treatment was that the plaintiffs-employees had performed poorly in the past). Therefore, Cornwell's qualifications do nothing to discredit Sharp’s proffered rationale for demoting Cornwell. . There is none. Additionally, were there such, there is neither claim nor evidence that Sharp had a hand in the hiring which led to Cornwell’s singular status. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9498726. Public record. Not legal advice.