# Margaret L. Hosty, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba v. Patricia Carter, and Governors State University

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · June 20, 2005 · 412 F.3d 731

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9498105

## Case

- **Full name:** Margaret L. HOSTY, Jeni S. Porche, and Steven P. Barba, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Patricia CARTER, Defendant-Appellant, and Governors State University, Et Al., Defendants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** June 20, 2005
- **Citations:** 412 F.3d 731; 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1897; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11761; 2005 WL 1423263
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Evans
- **Judges:** Flaum, Posner, Coffey, Easterbrook, Ripple, Manton, Kanne, Rovner, Wood, Evans, Williams
- **Cited by:** 53 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9498105

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that if a student newspaper at a public university “operated in a public forum, the University could not vet its contents”
- noting that when a forum is “declared open to speech ex ante, [participants] may not be censored ex post” when government decides the speech is not welcome

## Opinion text

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge,
joined by ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, dissenting.
In concluding that Hazelwood extends to a university setting, the majority applies limitations on speech that the Supreme Court created for use in the narrow circumstances of elementary and secondary education. Because these restrictions on free speech rights have no place in the world of college and graduate school, I respectfully dissent.
The majority’s conclusion flows from an incorrect premise&emdash;that there is no legal distinction between college and high school students. In reality, however, “[t]he Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many respects.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 , 99 S.Ct. 3035 , 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979). Age, for which grade level is a very good indicator, 1 has always defined legal rights. As the Court has noted:
*740 Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.
Planned Parenthood of Missouri, v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 , 96 S.Ct. 2831 , 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
This principle is clear with respect to free speech rights, where the Court has delineated a consistent line between high-school-age students and those at the university level. As the Court noted in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 , 238 n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 1346 , 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000), “the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of students ha[s] been confined to high schools whose students and their schools’ relation to them are different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts in college education.” (Internal citations omitted.) See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,180 , 92 S.Ct. 2338 , 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972) (“[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.”).
There are two reasons why the law treats high school students differently than it treats college students, who “are, of course, young adults,” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 , 274 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 269 , 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981): high school students are less mature and the missions of the respective institutions are different. These differences make it clear that Ha-zelwood does not apply beyond high school contact.
It is self-evident that, as a general matter, juveniles are less mature than adults. Indeed, “during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635 , 99 S.Ct. 3035 . See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 , 88 S.Ct. 1274 , 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (“[A]t least in some precisely delineated areas, a child — like someone in a captive audience — is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”). It is this reasoning that dictated the results in Hazelwood and Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. In Hazelwood, the Court emphasized that a different First Amendment standard is appropriate in a high school setting because those students are young, emotionally immature, and more likely to be inappropriately influenced by school-sponsored speech on controversial topics. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272, 108 S.Ct. 562 . It was, therefore, reasonable to restrict publication of an article about teenage pregnancy. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 , 106 S.Ct. 3159 , 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), where the Court permitted a high school to sanction a student for making a lewd student council election speech, makes a similar point. The Court emphasized that “[t]he speech could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience” - Id. at 683-84 , 106 S.Ct. 3159 (emphasis added). 2 The same con *741 cerns simply do not apply to college students, who are certainly (as a general matter) more mature, independent thinkers. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 , 91 S.Ct. 2091 , 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971), establishes this point. The Court upheld a federal law that provided funding to church-related colleges and universities for construction of facilities for secular educational purposes. The Court noted that precol-lege students may not have the maturity to make them own decisions on religion; however, “college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrinations.”
Not only is there a distinction between college and high school students themselves, the missions of the two institutions are quite different. Elementary and secondary schools have “custodial and tutelary responsibility for children,” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 , 122 S.Ct. 2559 , 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (holding that “Fourth Amendment rights ... are different in public schools than elsewhere”), and are largely concerned with the “inculcation” of “values.” Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 , 106 S.Ct. 3159 ; see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 , 99 S.Ct. 1589 , 60 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979) (“The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions[J”). A university has a different purpose — to expose students to a “marketplace of ideas.” Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 , 87 S.Ct. 675 , 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967) (emphasizing that the “Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas .... ”). See also Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231 , 120 S.Ct. 1346 , 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000) (“[Recognition must be given as well to the important and substantial purposes of the University, which seeks to facilitate a wide range of speech.”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 , 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (noting that intellectual curiosity of students remains today a central determination of a university’s success and asserting that restriction of that curiosity “risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 , 98 S.Ct. 2733 , 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (noting that an atmosphere of “ ‘speculation, experiment and creation’ ” is “essential to the quality of higher education” (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 , 77 S.Ct. 1203 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 -68 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269 (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ ”).
As the Supreme Court perhaps best articulated in Healy v. James.
[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” The college classroom with its *742 surrounding environs is peculiarly the “ ‘marketplace of ideas,’ ” and we break no new constitutional ground in affirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.
408 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 92 S.Ct. 2338 , 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 , 81 S.Ct. 247 , 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960), and Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 , 87 S.Ct. 675 ). Based on this important notion, I do not believe it is appropriate for this court to extend Hazel-wood to the college and university setting.
The majority’s holding, furthermore, is particularly unfortunate considering the manner in which Hazelwood has been used in the high school setting to restrict controversial speech. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the school district’s justification for refusing to publish family planning advertisements in high school newspapers was reasonable under the Hazelwood standard); Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728 , 737-38 (7th Cir.1994) (upholding the decision of an elementary school principal who prohibited a student from wearing shirts with messages such as “Unfair Grades” and “Racism”); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir.1989) (upholding the decision of a high school administration to exclude a student from a student council race because he made a rude comment about the assistant principal in a speech delivered at a school assembly).
If the plaintiffs’ allegations are true, this case epitomizes this concern. The Innovator, as opposed to writing merely about football games, actually chose to publish hard-hitting stories. And these articles were critical of the school administration. In response, rather than applauding the young journalists, the University decided to prohibit publication unless a school official reviewed the paper’s content before it was printed. New restrictions on speech seem to run more afoul of basic First Amendment values. First, prior restraints are particularly noxious under the Constitution. See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 , 96 S.Ct. 2791 , 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (“prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 , 51 S.Ct. 625 , 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931) (“it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment’s free press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication”). Second, and even more fundamental, as Justice Frankfurter stated (albeit in somewhat dated language) in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 , 64 S.Ct. 1240 , 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944), “one of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures.” College students — voting-age citizens and potential future leaders — should feel free to question, challenge, and criticize government action. Nevertheless, as a result of today’s holding, Dean Carter could have censored the Innovator by merely establishing “legitimate pedagogical reasons.” This court now gives the green light to school administrators to restrict student speech in a manner inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Dean Carter is entitled to qualified immunity. Prior to Hazelwood , courts were consistently clear that university administrators could not require prior review of student media or otherwise censor student newspapers. See, e.g., Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir.1983); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir.1973); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.1973), adopted en banc *743 in 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.1973); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1266 (D.Colo.1971); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F.Supp. 1329 (D.Mass.1970); Dickey v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 273 F.Supp. 613 (M.D.Ala.1967), vacated as moot sub nom. Troy St. Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir.1968); Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108 , 343 N.Y.S.2d 333 , 296 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y.1973); Mazart v. State, 109 Misc.2d 1092 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y.Ct.Cl.1981); Milliner v. Turner, 436 So.2d 1300 (La.Ct.App.1983).
Hazelwood did not change this well-established rule. So, the question becomes, did anything after Hazelwood occur that would suggest to a reasonable person in Dean Carter’s position that she could prohibit publication simply because she did not like the articles it was publishing? 3 The answer is clearly “no.” In fact, a review of the cases, including those the majority relies on, establishes that no case law would have led any reasonable official in Dean Carter’s position to believe she had such power.
To begin, both the First Circuit (explicitly) and Sixth Circuit (implicitly) are of the view that Hazelwood does not apply in the university setting. In Student Government Association v. Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts, 868 F.2d 473 , 480 n. 6 (1st Cir.1989), the First Circuit held that Hazelwood “is not applicable to college newspapers.” In Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir.2001) (en banc), a dispute involving a college yearbook, the court determined that Hazel-tuood had “little application” to the case. Id. at 346 n. 5. In so noting, the court ruled that the university’s yearbook constituted a limited public forum in which content-based regulations were subject to strict scrutiny. The court then held that the administration’s decision to confiscate the yearbook, due to unhappiness over its content, violated the First Amendment.
The decisions the majority cites in support of its position, moreover, are inapplicable. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir.1991), and Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir.2004), both concerned free speech rights within the classroom. Bishop held that a university could order a professor to stop interjecting his personal religious beliefs into his class comments during instruction time. Ax-son-Flynn held that an acting student at a university could be required to say script fines that conflict with her Mormon faith as part of the curriculum. These are very different situations than free speech rights of student journalists engaged in an extracurricular activity. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit recognized such a distinction and explicitly limited its holding: “We hold that the Hazelwood framework is applicable in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.” Id. at 1289. It specifically noted, “We acknowledge that some circuits have cast doubt on the application of Hazelwood in the context of university extracurricular activities. However, because Axson-Flynn’s speech occurred as part of a curricular assignment during class time and in the classroom, we need not reach any analysis of university’s students’ extracurricu *744 lar speech.” Id. at 1286 n. 6 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Finally, I am hard-pressed to see the relevance of Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir.1995). That case concerned a ninth grader who challenged her teacher’s decision not to accept a research paper because it was on an unapproved topic. Regardless, Kincaid , not Settle , constitutes the Sixth Circuit’s definitive word on the issue. 4
Therefore, considering that no court, both before or after Hazelwood , has held that a university may censor a student newspaper, and the only authorities to suggest otherwise are not directly on point, I believe that it was “clearly established” that the University could not deny funding to the school newspaper it found objectionable.
The majority also states that Dean Carter is entitled to qualified immunity because “A reasonable person in Dean Carter’s position was not bound to recognize that the Innovator operated in a designated public forum.” Although an objective standard, I believe it is noteworthy that, as the district court noted, “Defendants concede that the Innovator serves as a public forum.” 174 F.Supp.2d 782 , 786 (N.D.Ill.2001). A review of the facts, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, support Dean Carter’s litigation strategy below. Governors State University, by express policy and practice, placed exclusive editorial control of the newspaper with the student editors. Indeed, its own policy stated that the student staff “will determine content and format of their respective publications without censorship or advance approval.” The Innovator is an independent publication organized and published by students on their own time. The publication is not part of an academic program, but rather an extracurricular activity. The students are provided an advisor, but it is not a class taught by a faculty member, and the advisor did not make any content decisions, only advice was offered. Considering these facts, a reasonable person in Dean Carter’s shoes would have believed the Innovator operated as a public forum.
In conclusion, because I believe that Ha-zelwood does not apply, no pedagogical concerns can justify suppressing the student speech here. Dean Carter violated clearly established First Amendment law in censoring the student newspaper. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, only about one percent of those enrolled in American colleges and universities in 2002 were under the age of 18. See 2002 U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey (CPS) Rep., Table A-6, "Age Distribution of College Students 14 years Old and Over, by Sex: October 1947 to 2002.”
. Other decisions of the Court outside the free speech arena likewise emphasize that greater restrictions are permitted on the rights of juveniles because they are less mature. For *741 example, in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 , 112 S.Ct. 2649 , 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), the Court noted that “there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.” Id. at 592 , 112 S.Ct. 2649 .
. Considering that the law was clearly established that college administrators could not control school newspapers, the majority wrongly focuses on the fact that post-Hazel-wood decisions had not "clearly established that college administrators must keep hands off all student newspapers.” The question is not whether later decisions established that college administrators "must keep hands off,” but rather whether later decisions did anything to change the already clearly established rule. In other words, did decisions after Hazelwood say anything to suggest that college administrators could censor school newspapers.
. The majoritywisely does not, as Dean Carter does, rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 908 , 123 S.Ct. 1488 , 155 L.Ed.2d 228 (2003), and the decision of a panel of the Sixth Circuit in Kincaid, 191 F.3d 719 (1999). With respect to Brown , only one judge on the panel, Judge Graber, approved of the application of Hazelwood . Judge Gra-ber, moreover, applied Hazelwood only in the context of a student's masters thesis included in the school’s curriculum. Brown, 308 F.3d at 949 . Again, a very different situation than the one presented here. As for Kincaid, that panel decision had already been vacated by the full circuit when Dean Carter restrained publication of the Innovator. See 197 F.3d at 828 (6th Cir.1999) (vacating panel decision).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9498105. Public record. Not legal advice.
