# Jeffrey McKinley v. City of Mansfield

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · April 11, 2005 · 404 F.3d 418

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497909

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeffrey MCKINLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MANSFIELD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** April 11, 2005
- **Citations:** 404 F.3d 418; 22 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1254; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5875; 2005 WL 819969
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Bright
- **Judges:** Keith, Clay, Bright
- **Cited by:** 162 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497909

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the defendant could not be liable for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff “present[ed] no evidence suggesting that defendants conspired with, influenced, or even participated in, [the prosecutor]’s decision to bring charges against him”
- holding that the defendant could not be liable for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff “presented] no evidence suggesting that defendants conspired with, influenced, or even participated in, [the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges against him”
- holding that malicious prosecution claim failed because plaintiff “present[ed] no evidence suggesting that defendants conspired with, influenced, or even participated in, [the prosecutor’s] decision to bring charges against [the plaintiff]”
- holding that police officers can incur § 1983 liability for allegedly coercing a suspect to make self- incriminating statements even though it was another person, the prosecutor, who used the statements in a criminal case
- holding that police officers can incur § 1983 liability for allegedly coercing a suspect to make self-incriminating statements even though it was another person, the prosecutor, who used the statements in a criminal case

## Opinion text

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in affirming the district court’s entry of summary judgment as to McKinley’s malicious prosecution claim. I, however, would affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment as to McKinley’s Fifth Amendment claim to all appellees, including Officer Fortney.
McKinley concedes, and the rule is, that no Fifth Amendment violation occurs until the wrongfully obtained statement is introduced against a defendant in a criminal proceeding. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 , 123 S.Ct. 1994 , 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003) (“a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.”). Therefore, if McKinley’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated, the violation occurred when the prosecutor introduced the transcript of the second interview at McKinley’s trial. 1
If, as the majority now holds, Officer Fortney might be deemed a participant in the violation, he would nonetheless not be liable. Even assuming a scenario in this case that Officer Fortney knowingly collaborated with the prosecutor to introduce the evidence in question at trial, that would not save McKinley’s right of action. In this case Officer Fortney did not violate McKinley’s privilege against self-incrimination in the interviews because he advised McKinley that the statements would not be used against him in any criminal proceedings. The interviews were properly conducted in accordance with the rule announced in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 , 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967).
The remaining question is whether McKinley’s Fifth Amendment right should be deemed violated when Officer Fortney turned the result of the interviews over to the prosecutor who introduced the statements at McKinley’s trial. To hold Officer Fortney to have violated McKinley’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by turning over this evidence would require the assumption that Officer Fort-ney could foresee that the prosecutor would offer the tainted evidence at trial, that defense counsel would not object, and that the trial judge would err in admitting the evidence.
The assumptions made above would create a new right of action, not previously decided by a court and not clearly established at the time Officer Fortney turned the evidence over to the prosecutor. As such, Officer Fortney should be protected by qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (holding that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded *447 from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
Moreover, the tainted evidence was rejected on appeal and the conviction overturned. That result could serve as a determination that McKinley’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not in fact violated. Cf. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 , 123 S.Ct. 1994 , 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003).
Accordingly, I would affirm as to Officer Fortney.
. A Fifth Amendment constitutional violation is different than a violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the violation occurs at the time of the improper search or seizure. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391 (6th Cir.1999).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497909. Public record. Not legal advice.