# Kelli Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad Company Mississippi Department of Transportation

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · September 10, 2004 · 385 F.3d 568

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497423

## Case

- **Full name:** Kelli SMALLWOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY; Mississippi Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** September 10, 2004
- **Citations:** 385 F.3d 568; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 19127; 2004 WL 2047314
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Jolly
- **Judges:** King, Jolly, Higginbotham, Davis, Jones, Smith, Wiener, Barksdale, Garza, Demoss, Benavides, Stewart, Dennis, Clement, Prado, Pickering
- **Cited by:** 961 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497423

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, “when, on a motion to remand, a showing that compels a holding that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that state law would allow the plaintiff to recover against the in-state defendant necessarily compels the same result for the nonresident defendant…
- finding “when a defendant removes a case to federal court on a claim of improper joinder, the district court's first inquiry is whether the removing party has carried its heavy burden of proving that the joinder was improper. Indeed, until the removing party does so, the court…
- holding that, “when a nonresident defendant’s showing that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that state law would allow recovery against an in-state defendant equally disposes of all defendants, there is no improper joinder of the in-state defendant”; instead, “the e…
- holding that there is no improper joinder when "the allegation of improper joinder rests only on a showing that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that state law would allow recovery against the in-state defendant and that showing is equally dispositive of all defenda…
- explaining both approaches to fraudulent joinder analysis and explaining that summary inquiry is appropriate in “cases, hopefully few in number, in which a plaintiff has stated claim, but has misstated or omitted discrete facts that would determine the propriety of jomnder’’

## Opinion text

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
with whom EDITH H. JONES, JERRY E. SMITH, RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, EDITH BROWN CLEMENT and PRADO, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s strange compulsion to amend the traditional rules of fraudulent joinder based on a seldom cited 1914 fact-specific ease. 1 This is all the more strange in the light of the admonition we sounded recently: “[F]or the simple truth that we stand on the shoulders of those before us, if for no other reason, we must be hesitant when we act on recent flashes of ‘new’ insight to the fundamentals of governance”. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 227 (5th Cir.1998) (en banc), rev’d, 526 U.S. 574 , 119 S.Ct. 1563 , 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). In my view, the majority, in accepting the plaintiffs briefing and “new insights”, misreads the Supreme Court decision, disregards established precedent, designs a troublesome and unnecessary “common-defense” rule to amend a long established and fairer rule, offers meaningless reasoning to support its decision and creates confusion for the district courts — all for no other reason, as far as I can determine, than the satisfaction in finding a “buried treasure” obscured from our judicial predecessors for almost a century. 2
I
Up until today, our precedent has been rooted, established and clear, having evolved through the writings of solid and respected judges over many years. It asks a simple question and, eschewing personal motives of the plaintiff, applies an objective test to produce a fair answer: When a diverse defendant removes to federal court on grounds of fraudulent joinder we only ask, as the majority opinion acknowledges:
[Wjhether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an instate defendant, which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant.
Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 , Maj. Op. at 573 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) (Smallwood III). Our inquiry is designed to determine the single overarching question of whether the in-state defendant was joined “solely to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction”; if our objective test determines that the plaintiff cannot recover, then the in-state defendant is *578 deemed fraudulently joined and his “existence is disregarded for purposes of determining diversity”. 16 James Wm. Moore et al., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[2][c][iv][A] (3d ed.2004); see also Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 342 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir.2003)(Smallwood I), panel reh'g denied, 352 F.3d 220 (Smallwood II), reh'g en banc granted, 355 F.3d 357 (stating that “the purpose of the fraudulent joinder doctrine ... is to prevent a plaintiff from naming a nondiverse party as a defendant solely for the purposes of depriving the court of jurisdiction”).
The subjective intent of the plaintiff is irrelevant; instead, our precedent, unequivocally and without exception, has evaluated claims of fraudulent joinder with a simple, well-understood, objective two-prong test 3 — that is, until today. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.2003); Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir.2003); Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 311-12 (5th Cir.2002); Heritage Bank v. Redcom Lab., Inc., 250 F.3d 319, 323 (5th Cir.2001); Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 698-99 (5th Cir.1999); Rodriguez v. Sabatino, 120 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir.1997); Burden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.1995); Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir.1995); Laughlin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 882 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir.1989); Ted-der v. F.M.C. Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1979); Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir.1962).
Because we eschew a subjective test, our test does not seek to determine the “truth” of exactly why the nondiverse defendant was joined as a defendant in the lawsuit. 4 Instead, the many judges who have preceded us on this court have determined that this test produces a practical “truth”: that is, it is reasonable and fair to assume that a lawyer, acting in accordance with the code of professional responsibility, will not sue someone against whom he has no reasonable basis of recovery, unless it is for an improper reason; on the other hand, when a lawyer sues someone against whom he has a reasonable basis of recovery, it is unlikely that the joinder was for an improper reason. 5 In short, it is always “improper” — professionally and ethically— to join any party to a suit if there is no basis of recovery, a point that apparently has no place in the reasoning of the majority.
Moreover, our established test is an efficient test because it focuses only on the joinder of the nondiverse defendant and does not require us to examine the case against the diverse defendant. The majority’s “common-defense” rule, on the other hand, requires the district court to go one step further and examine the entirety of the case.
*579 II
A
According to the majority, however, this traditional analysis is infected with error, long overlooked by scores of preceding judges but now revealed: The majority has declared that a New Legal Truth has been uncovered — The Common-Defense Theory. Although the panel’s bold proclamation of the new discovery has been modulated by the en banc majority, and although the majority has narrowed the open-ended sweep of the panel, the unfortunate amendment to our traditional rule remains:
When the nonresident defendant’s showing that there is no reasonable basis for predicting that state law would allow recovery against the in-state defendant equally disposes of all defendants, there is no improper joinder of the in-state defendant.
Smallwood III, 385 F.3d at 571 , Maj. Op. at 571. 6 Under this rule, even if the diverse defendant completely satisfies our traditional test and demonstrates that the plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of establishing a cause of action against the in-state defendant, the traditional rule is abrogated, and the case is remanded, irrespective of the plaintiffs inability to recover in state court, if the diverse and nondi-verse defendants happen to possess the same defense.
B
The majority’s support for its creation of the common defense rule is the turn of the century fact-specific Supreme Court case, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146 , 34 S.Ct. 278 , 58 L.Ed. 544 (1914). The pertinent language — cherry-picked and shorn of context — upon which the majority relies as compelling a common-defense rule, states:
As no negligent act or omission personal to the railway company was charged, and its liability, like that of the two employees, was, in effect, predicated upon the alleged negligence of the latter, the showing manifestly went to the merits of the action as an entirety, and not to the joinder; that is to say, it indicated that the plaintiffs case was ill founded as to all the defendants. Plainly, this was not such a showing as to engender or compel the conclusion that the two employees were wrongfully brought into a controversy which did not concern them. As they admittedly were in charge of the movement of the train, and *580 their negligence was apparently the principal matter in dispute, the plaintiff had the same right, under the laws of Kentucky, to insist upon their presence as real defendants as upon that of the railway company.
Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153 , 34 S.Ct. 278 . As discussed below, however, the correct reading of Cockrell does not justify, much less compel the creation of the “common-defense” rule.
Since Cockrell was decided in 1914, the only circuit court decision that, previous to today, has interpreted it as proclaiming a “common-defense” exception to the fraudulent joinder rule is the Third Circuit’s opinion in Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.1990). 7 Equally revealing of the novelty of the majority’s position is that neither Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and ProceduRE nor Moore’s Federal Practice — the two most authoritative treatises on federal practice — cites Cockrell as relating to such a theory as “common-defense” or, for that matter, even intimates that such a rule exists. 8
C
I turn now to address the majority’s reliance on Cockrell , In Cockrell the plaintiff sued the Railroad and the in-state engineer and fireman who operated the train that caused the death of the intestate. The plaintiff alleged that, although the negligence was that of the in-state engineer and fireman in the manner that they operated the train, the railroad— which committed no independent act of negligence — was nevertheless liable for the negligent conduct of its employees. In short, the entire suit was solely founded (or “ill-founded”) on the conduct of the instate defendants; no argument could be made, as the Court put it, that the two instate defendants were joined to a suit in which they did not belong. Indeed, but for their conduct the railroad would not have been in the suit; the in-state defendants could not possibly have been fraudulently joined because their conduct was the only actionable conduct in the case; there was in essence but one ease and it was against the joined defendants themselves.
With respect to the grounds of fraudulent joinder of the two employees, the Railroad’s only basis was that the plaintiffs allegations against these two in-state defendants were “false and untrue”. See Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153 , 34 S.Ct. 278 . To be sure, the Railroad’s claim of fraudulent joinder would have required that a trial on the merits be conducted in a removal proceeding.
That the majority misreads Cockrell as calling for modification of our traditional *581 rules of fraudulent joinder is demonstrated by how neatly the traditional rules decide the case for fraudulent joinder presented in Cockrell : We look at the complaint and first conclude that the complaint clearly states a claim against the fireman and the engineer for their negligent conduct, a claim that has a possibility of prevailing under state law; we next look at the railroad’s claim of fraudulent joinder, that is, that the negligence claims were “false and untrue”; we then apply our rule that disputed factual merits will not be tried in removal proceedings; and we would have remanded. This exercise demonstrates that the majority has vastly overstated the implications of Cockrell . In fact, it is only by seizing language taken out of- context and ignoring the sum of this case in all of its parts — factual and legal — that the majority creates its misguided amendment to our traditional rule.
Still further, however, in virtually all respects the instant case is distinguishable from Cockrell . First, there is no issue of vicarious liability here and consequently the “entirety” of the case against Illinois Central is not premised on the liability of MDOT. Unlike Cockrell , Smallwood seeks to hold Illinois Central liable for its own act of negligence — its negligent delay in installing safety devices. Compare with Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153 , 34 S.Ct. 278 (stating that “no negligent act or omission personal to the railway company was charged”). Consequently, unlike the Railroad in Cockrell whose liability was totally dependent upon the liability of -the joined defendants (its employees), Illinois Central’s liability was not predicated on the negligence of MDOT; instead, its liability was independent of MDOT’s liability. Compare with Cockrell (stating that the railroad’s liability “was, in effect, predicated upon the negligence of the [employees]”). Id. Therefore, the showing of conflict preemption in this case, unlike Cockrell , does not go the merits of the action in its entirety, that is, the-defense is not a traverse of the allegations of the entire complaint, as in Cockrell , but only indicates that, as to MDOT, Smallwood’s claims are procedurally barred; stated differently MDOT’s defense does not attack the facts upon which the plaintiffs case against Illinois Central is founded nor automatically absolve Illinois Central of its own alleged negligence. Compare with Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153 , 34 S.Ct. 278 (stating that “the showing manifestly went to the merits of the action as an entirety, and not to the joinder, that is to say, it indicated that the plaintiffs case was ill founded as to all defendants” (emphasis added)).
In sum, it is only through a strained application based on a serious misreading that the majority inflates the significance and relevance of Cockrell , a case that has lain basically dormant for all of its 90-year life.
III
Not only does the majority’s misreading and misapplication of Cockrell betray the weakness of its position, the majority fails to come up with any compelling reasons that might otherwise support its misadventure.
It argues that its theory is justified, because the focus in fraudulent joinder cases should be on the joinder of the non-diverse defendant — not on the merits of the case. This “focus” argument is' a strawman. Of course the focus should be on the joinder, but on the joinder .as a whole. Beyond uttering the platitudinous axiom that the focus should be on the joinder, the majority fails to offer any explanation of why the viability of the cause of action against the joined defendant is not part of that focus; indeed, only *582 a few lines later, the majority states that the joinder inquiry is whether the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the joined party. But, as with other inconsistent and contradictory statements in the opinion, the common-defense rule duels with this professed statement of the governing rule.
The majority may be unwilling to face it, but the plain and undeniable fact is that only the traditional test focuses exclusively on the joinder; the common-defense theory requires that the court look beyond the joinder of the nondiverse defendant to the entirety of the case and determine the defenses of the diverse defendant as well. If the majority were serious in trumpeting a test that focuses on the joinder, and not the entire case, it would adhere to the traditional test.
The majority seems to forget that the overarching purpose of improper joinder inquiry is to determine if the defendant has been joined solely to defeat diversity. See James Wm. Mooee et al, MooRe’s FedERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[2][c][iv][A] (3d ed.2004). 9 The weakness of the majority’s argument is that it fails to demonstrate how the common-defense rule serves the purpose of the improper joinder inquiry— that is, to determine whether the defendant has been joined solely to defeat diversity — any better than, or as well as, the traditional test does. Indeed, as we have demonstrated earlier, the traditional test produces a “practical truth”, where the common defense theory does not even purport to do so.
The majority argues that even though Illinois Central showed there could be no recovery against the joined defendant, it failed to prove that the joinder of MDOT was improper and that Illinois Central “brought no contention going to the propriety of the joinder.” Smallwood III, 385 F.3d at 574 , Maj. Op. at 574 (emphasis added). It is difficult to understand how the majority can make such a serious misstatement, unless it is somehow contending that Illinois Central had no right to rely upon 40 years of consistent precedent. Illinois Central relied upon our well-established precedent and demonstrated to the satisfaction of the district court — a result which the majority does not challenge— that the plaintiff had no reasonable possibility of recovering against MDOT; it was clearly improper to sue (and thus “join”) MDOT when the plaintiff had no hope of recovery against MDOT. Furthermore, even in the light of Cockrell , the defense of MDOT did not go to the merits of the entire case that the plaintiff had alleged against Illinois Central; only a procedural defense was raised to bar Smallwood’s claims against MDOT. Thus, it is a serious misstatement to suggest that Illinois Central “brought no contention going to the propriety of the joinder” when Illinois Central demonstrated that the .plaintiffs claims against MDOT were barred; this showing meant, under the law existing until today, that MDOT was joined solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. This argument goes directly to the propriety of the joinder by any standard and it is incorrect for the majority to assert otherwise.
In an attempt to provide some logic to its argument, the majority argues that because MDOT’s successful defense also requires the dismissal of the entire case, the *583 joinder of MDOT is not improper because the removed case is only a meritless case, not a fraudulently joined case. The majority connects no further dots to this argument. Left hanging, as its postulate is, it follows that the majority argues that the lack of merit of a case determines remova-bility — -which it surely does not. Seizing-on a dichotomy between removable and meritless cases, the majority simply has not sorted out the confusion of its contention: it argues that when both defendants possess the same complete defense the claim is meritless and the case is non-removable; yet, it surely does not contend that the meritless case is non-removable when the respective defenses of the diverse and nondiverse defendants are different, and result in the dismissal of the entire case. Thus, it is clear that the attempted rationale of equating a completely meritless case with non-removability is meritless in itself.
The most baseless argument of the majority is that it is only “applying our traditional improper joinder analysis.” Smallwood III, 385 F.3d at 574 , Maj. Op. at 574. This statement represents a retreat into major denial of what it has so plainly done. Indeed, it is incomprehensible how the majority would expect this statement to be taken seriously. We have previously string-cited the numerous cases applying our traditional fraudulent joinder analysis, none of which — I repeat, none of which— has any element of the common-defense rule that the majority tattoos on our traditional analysis. Even the majority acknowledges that under our traditional analysis:
the test for fraudulent joinder is whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an instate defendant.
Smallwood III, 385 F.3d at 573 , Maj. Op. at 573. Thus, there is no question but that, under the majority’s own test, MDOT was fraudulently joined since the majority does not deny that there is no possibility of recovering against MDOT. Because it asserts that it is only following our traditional test, one would expect the majority to follow its own pronouncement of the traditional analysis. But no; notwithstanding the unequivocal words the majority expresses in one part of the opinion, the majority then contradicts itself and shapes a new rale: even though there is no reasonable basis for predicting that state law would allow recovery against MDOT, it is nevertheless properly joined and the case is not removable, because its defense disposes of the entire case and renders it a “meritless” case, not a “fraudulently joined” case. This clearly is a departure from the traditional test for fraudulent joinder and the majority’s denial of what it has done demonstrates its ultimate lack of confidence in its novel theory.
In sum, the arguments that the majority makes to shore up its misreading of Cockrell deflate under any careful examination and make unavoidable the conclusion that the majority has been beguiled by Small-wood’s dare to this court to be modern— 1914 style. 10
*584 IV
With fullest respect, I dissent because the majority, for no sound legal reason that I can determine, has taken upon itself to amend our established rules for determining diversity jurisdiction, while admonishing that such amendments should be left to Congress. It has done so in strange ways. It has relied on a Supreme Court case that has been dormant to the world for close to a century and has no relation to the facts here. The majority acknowledges our traditional rule as controlling. It then amends the rule by adding a “but if’ clause. It then denies that it has done what it has just done. It offers meaningless ad hoc arguments that skirmish with its earlier pronouncements. It then sounds alarms that Strawbridge v. Curtiss is under attack — a gratuitous and phantom irrelevancy to the matter before us. It decries a closet attack on the well-pleaded complaint rule that seems to be a decoy. All of this, and yet there is no explanation why our traditional rule does not work better to serve the purpose of the fraudulent joinder inquiry: To determine whether the in-state defendant was joined “solely to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction.”
Even though I am baffled why the majority would produce this aberrant writing, it is nevertheless with collegial respect that I dissent. 11
. It is also odd that the majority has jettisoned the term "fraudulent joinder”, used by all of our cases for five decades and by the treatises, for the term "improper” joinder. Apparently the majority has concluded that it better serves its new way of looking at an established concept. We note, however, that "fraudulent joinder" was the term used by the Supreme Court in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146 , 34 S.Ct. 278 , 58 L.Ed. 544 (1914), which happens to be the source of authority for the majority's new rule.
. In fairness to the district court and to the defendants, it should be noted that "common defense” argument was never raised until new attorneys entered the case on appeal. Thus, the defendants were deprived of developing any arguments below to counter the "common defense rule” and the district court has been denied the opportunity to express itself on the subject. Nevertheless, the majority proceeds straightforward to accept and adopt this untimely raised argument, contending that it is permitted to do so, because it is jurisdictional.- See fn. 20 Maj. Op.
. Under our two-prong test the diverse defendant must establish either "(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.” Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.2003). Only the second prong is before us today.
. Subjective tests could often require attempts to penetrate the mind of the plaintiff and turn removal hearings into lengthy proceedings.
. "Rule 11 imposes a duty on attorneys to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with the court are well-grounded in fact, legally tenable, and 'not interposed for any improper purpose.’ ” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 11); See also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (2002) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous”).
. Notwithstanding the objections we have with respect to the majority opinion, we commend the majority’s efforts to define more precisely the rule's narrow application. The majority has restricted the rule to apply only when the in-state defendant's defense is identical to the one asserted by the diverse defendant, which defense automatically and simultaneously disposes of the plaintiff’s case against the diverse defendant as well. See Smallwood III, 385 F.3d at 571 , Maj. Op. at 571 (stating that the defense must "equally dispose of" the diverse defendant); id. at 574-75 , Maj. Op. at 574-75 (stating that the defense must "necessarily compelQ” the same result as to the diverse defendant); id. at 575 , Maj. Op. at 575 (stating that the defense must be "equally dispositive of all defendants").
A somewhat more complicated application of the "common defense" rule occurs when there are two or more defenses available to the non-diverse defendant, only one of which is "common” to the diverse defendant. In such a case, the federal court may nevertheless have jurisdiction if, on a motion to remand by the plaintiff, the removing party asserts and proves only the non-common defense. Because the defense at issue would not be "common,” the traditional rule (no reasonable possibility of recovery in the state court against the instate defendant) would apply — not the "common defense" rule adopted here by the majority.
. In Boyer , the Third Circuit relied on the same passage from Cockrell as mandating a common defense rule. Boyer, 913 F.2d 108 . In fact, in Smallwood I, the panel relied heavily on Boyer’s interpretation of Cockrell and adopted verbatim Boyer's version of the "common defense” rule. Smallwood I, 342 F.3d at 405.
. Federal Practice and Procedure mentions Cockrell only for the propositions that (1) "the burden on the party seeking removal on the basis of fraudulent joinder is a heavy one,” (14B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 3723 (3d ed.1998)), (2) “[rjesort to the allegations in the notice of removal also may be necessary to show that one or more parties have been fraudulently joined to defeat removal,” (14C Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 3734 (3d ed.1998)), and (3) "[ajllegations in the notice may be used to show that parties have been fraudulently joined to defeat removal.” 20 Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Federal Practice Deskbook § 42 (2002). Moore’s Federal Practice, on the other hand, does not appear to cite Cockrell at all.
. The panel opinion expressly agreed with this statement of purpose, as indeed does the unanimous precedent of our circuit. See Smallwood I, 342 F.3d at 407 . The majority, however, finds this statement of purpose inconvenient to the arguments it is now making and in a circular fashion says that "the purpose of the improper joinder inquiry is to determine whether or not the in-state defendant was properly joined”. Smallwood III, 385 F.3d at 573 , Maj. Op. at 573. It cites no authority for its circular statement of purpose.
. We do note that the majority opinion contains what we consider to be several irrelevancies, which we suppose are inserted as rhetoric to bolster its effort to sell the "common-defense” rule: to-wit, the reference to Strawbridge v. Curtiss and the well-pleaded complaint rule among others, which have nothing to do with the case.
Of more importance, call to do so, addresses procedure and discovery issues that arise in remand proceedings. This writing is fairly unremarkable except *584 that it appears to be written to underscore one side of our precedent. It certainly has no precedential effect. These remarks are pure dicta because no one has made an issue of this subject at any point in these proceedings. It certainly has no relevance to deciding this case. The further insignificance of this writing is demonstrated by the majority’s failure to cite any authority, notwithstanding the fact that we have a long list of precedents addressing the appropriateness of discovery in removal proceedings. See Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382 , 389, 393-94 (5th Cir.2000); Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 182 F.3d 353, 356-57 (5th Cir.1999); Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213 , 217 & n. 18 (5th Cir.1995); Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 263 (5th Cir.1995); Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 175-76 (5th Cir.1995); Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815-16 (5th Cir.1993); LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d 267, 271 (5th Cir.1992); Carriere v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.1990); Keating v. Shell Chemical Co., 610 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir.1980). It is this authority that has prece-dential value.
. Judge Clement’s dissent is insightful and states a principle that is not only consistent with our traditional rule, but is the embodiment of that rule: In removal proceedings, it is not for the district courts to decide a contested and undecided legal issue when the court must choose between two arguments, each with plausible merit. In such a situation, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable possibility of recovery in state court. The joinder, therefore, is not improper, irrespective of what the district court may think is the correct answer. Yet, the majority ignores her writing, never addressing whether this case might be decided and remanded under Judge Clement's approach, which could render its common defense theory unnecessary for a remand of this case.
Judge Smith's dissent raises credible issues that demonstrate the confusing jurisdictional and collateral estoppel possibilities that the majority opinion creates, and then refuses to address. For example, because the majority’s explanation for distinguishing between the traditional rule and the common defense rule is that the entire case is a meritless case — not a fraudulently joined case — it would appear that it is necessary, under the common defense rule, to determine the merits of the common defense in order to determine if it is a “meritless case.” And, although the common defense analysis may ultimately determine that the federal court has no jurisdiction to entertain the case, the federal court surely would have had jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, and the finding of a merit-less case would have been made when the federal court was acting within its jurisdiction. As such, the federal court decision may, on remand to the state court, constitute a binding finding in the state case.
The majority would act more responsibly by confronting and attempting to resolve the *585 confusion that arises from its aberrant and troublesome decision. Its silence is truly regrettable and will be costly to the administration of justice.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497423. Public record. Not legal advice.
