# United States v. Pedro Calderon-Pena

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · August 24, 2004 · 383 F.3d 254

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497362

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pedro CALDERON-PENA, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 24, 2004
- **Citations:** 383 F.3d 254; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18036; 2004 WL 1888407
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Garza
- **Judges:** King, Jolly, Higginbotham, Davis, Jones, Smith, Wiener, Barksdale, Garza, Demoss, Benavides, Stewart, Dennis, Clement, Prado, Pickering
- **Cited by:** 164 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled in part, on other grounds by United States v. Fredis Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d 169 (2018).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497362

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the offense of child endangerment was not a "crime of violence" under § 2L1.2 because child endangerment did not "have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another as a required element."
- holding that whenever a statute has alternative methods of commission, the court "may look to charging papers to see which of the various statutory alternatives are involved in the particular case"
- reasoning that a child-endangerment offense is not a crime of violence, because the offense does not require any bodily contact or awareness of danger
- noting that "whenever a statute provides a list of alternative methods of commission ... we may look to charging papers to see which of the various statutory alternatives are involved in the particular case."

## Opinion text

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I write separately because I agree with both the “use of force” analysis in Judge Smith’s dissent and with the interpretation of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) in Judge Jones’s dissent. I do not agree with the portions of Judge Jones’s dissent that indicate that the majority opinion in United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc), is correct. For the reasons expressed in my dissent in Vargas-Duran , I continue to believe that Vargas-Duran was wrongly decided. See Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d at 610 (Garza, J. dissenting).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497362. Public record. Not legal advice.