# United States v. Deunte L. Humphries

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · June 17, 2004 · 372 F.3d 653

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497090

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deunte L. HUMPHRIES, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 17, 2004
- **Citations:** 372 F.3d 653; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11898; 2004 WL 1351562
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gregory
- **Judges:** Gregory, Niemeyer, Williams
- **Cited by:** 155 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497090

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “if an officer smells the odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a person, the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing the crime of possession of marijuana” and thus has “authori…
- stating that "in the case of a search, when the odor emanates from a confined location such as an automobile or an apartment, we have held that officers may draw the conclusion that marijuana is present in the automobile or the apartment"
- recognizing that, in assessing totality of circumstances surrounding warrantless arrest, it is appropriate to consider, inter alia, “an officer’s practical experience and the inferences the officer may draw from that experience”
- explaining, in context of probable cause analysis, that officers may consider "evasive conduct that falls short of headlong flight," such as walking away from approaching officers at a quick pace and ignoring commands to stop
- stating that the "probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act"

## Opinion text

GREGORY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I concur only in the judgment reached by the majority. Because the district *661 court correctly found that Officer Venable had reasonable suspicion to stop Hum-phries, detain him, and to even pat him down, the arrest, whether valid or not, was harmless insofar as nothing additional was gained thereby. Accordingly, we need not reach the holding in the majority’s opinion.
I
Because the facts as stated in the majority’s opinion are sufficient, I will move directly to the ultimate findings of fact made by the district court. After hearing the arguments of counsel and taking a short recess, the district court made brief oral findings and ruled from the bench. The court acknowledged that Officer Vena-ble was “an experienced police officer who has testified many times in front of this Court.” J.A. at 95. The court also noted that Officer Venable smelled marijuana “emanating from the defendant at the distance of between 5 and 10 feet.” Id. Because the court was dissatisfied with the sole “theory” offered during the suppression hearing by the Government to support the arrest, id., Officer Humphries seemingly proceeded directly to formal arrest, and because the Government was “steadfast that there was probable cause to place the defendant under arrest,” the district court understandably granted the motion to suppress. J.A. at 96. In doing so, the court concluded that Officer Venable did not have probable cause to arrest Hum-phries. To the contrary, however, the Court found that “there was an abundance of information to allow Officer Venable to conduct an investigative detention, to question this defendant, and to perhaps pat him down for his safety.” Id.
II
We review determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion de novo. United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir.1994). A reviewing court, however, should take care to (1) review findings of historical fact only for clear error, and (2) to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). This is true because “a trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community. Such background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference.” Id.
The district court clearly found that Officer Venable had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Humphries. In fact, the district court found that “there was an abundance of information to allow Officer Venable to conduct an investigative detention, to question this defendant, and to perhaps pat him down for his safety.” 1 *662 Because the district court correctly found that Officer Venable was justified in stopping — or attempting to stop, as it were— Humphries and detaining him, and that he could have patted him down, United States v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671-72 (4th Cir.2003), the fact that Officer Venable “arrested” him first and then patted him down was, at bottom, harmless. Even if the arrest were illegal, nothing was gained from the arrest other than that which could have been properly seized pursuant to the lawful pat-down and investigative detention. Surely, evidence later seized, which could have been lawfully seized earlier, is not fruit of a poisonous tree when the “tree” itself — the stop and pat-down— was never poisonous in the first instance.
When suppressing evidence as the fruit of an illegal arrest, the guiding question is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, there was no “primary illegality.” And, it was the pat-down that lead Officer Venable to the weapon and contraband; there was no other intervening police action. Moreover, the purpose of suppressing evidence is to prevent similar misconduct on the part of the police in the future and to deny them any benefit from such conduct. Although one might envision a different— perhaps even better — course of action on the part of Officer Venable, it was hardly misconduct. Officer Venable did not embark on a fishing expedition merely hoping that “something might turn up.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 2 Unlike the police misconduct in Brown, supra, Humphries’ arrest was not effected for the purpose of obtaining evidence.
Accordingly, I would reverse the suppression order on the narrower ground of harmless arrest.
. The district court disagreed with the Government's theory that Officer Venable had probable cause to arrest Humphries for possession of marijuana. I note, however, that in the Government's brief it also argued in opposition to the motion to suppress that the "arrest” of Humphries was an "investigative detention.” Indeed, the Government's brief before the district court raised several theories to justify the arrest and pat-down, including: probable cause that "criminal activity was afoot,” J.A. at 23; hot pursuit, id..; investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), id. at 24 ; and search incident to lawful arrest, id. at 25 . Although the Government's arguments certainly could have been more precise, the district court was therefore not confined to one theory of arrest, i.e., for a misdemeanor possession offense. Perhaps the district court may have better understood the Government’s arguments had the Government argued specifically the theories asserted in their written briefs, instead of devoting considerable oral argument to the holding of United States v. Jones, 204 F.3d 541 (4th Cir.2000), which is distinguishable from this case.
. In Brown , the Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court’s per se rule that a confession that is otherwise improper under the Fifth Amendment, may not be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 . The Court emphasized the prophylactic purposes of the Fourth Amendment and held that a voluntary confession under the Fifth Amendment may be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment, as fruit of a poisonous tree, due to police misconduct, i.e., where "the detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up [or where the manner an] arrest was affected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion."

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497090. Public record. Not legal advice.