# Vernon Brown v. Allen D. Luebbers > Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · June 15, 2004 · 371 F.3d 458 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497062 ## Case - **Full name:** Vernon BROWN, Appellant, v. Allen D. LUEBBERS, Appellee - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - **Decided:** June 15, 2004 - **Citations:** 371 F.3d 458; 64 Fed. R. Serv. 437; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11672; 2004 WL 1315842 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Colloton - **Judges:** Arnold, Bowman, Bye, Colloton, Loken, Melloy, Morris, Murphy, Richard, Riley, Sheppard, Wollman - **Cited by:** 81 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497062 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the condition precedent for AEDPA deferential review is that the claim must have been adjudicated 3 Shelton's application for post-conviction relief is not contained in the Appendix. However, the government does not contend that this ground is procedurally default… - holding that AEDPA deference applied to a state court’s alternative holding where it assumed a trial error and applied harmless error review under Chapman - explaining that to qualify as an adjudication on the merits, the “state court’s decision must be a judgment—an adjudication—on a substantive issue— the merits (as compared with a procedural or technical point)” - holding state court adjudicated due process claim on the merits when it cited to relevant federal law and invoked the governing standard, even though state court’s brief discussion of claim was devoted to the state law evidentiary question - stating a condition precedent to applying AEDPA’s standard of review is that the state court adjudicated the petitioner’s claim on the merits ## Opinion text COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the opinion of the court, but add a few points to clarify my views. It is quite reasonable to ask, as does the dissent, whether the AEDPA-standard issue is properly before the en banc court, if the state did not assert before the three-judge panel that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) should apply to review of the state court’s adjudications. It must be remembered, however, that as this case first came to the en banc court on a petition for rehearing, a panel of the court already had reached and decided the question whether § 2254(d) applied in this case. Brown v. Luebbers, 344 F.3d 770, 785 (8th Cir.2003). At that point, the panel opinion established the law of the circuit on the AEDPA-standard issue, regardless what the parties had asserted in their briefs, and I believe it was properly the business of the en banc court *471 to decide whether the panel opinion should remain the law of the circuit on that-issue. If the panel opinion merely had reported a concession or waiver by the state in this case, and left the AEDPA-standard issue for another day, then the matter of judicial administration might be resolved differently- Harmless error analysis is sufficient to resolve this case, but with brief amplification, I also join the court’s conclusion that the state court proceedings did not result in a decision that involved an unreasonable application of Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 , 99 S.Ct. 2150 , 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979) (per curiam). With respect to reliability of the disputed letter, it is true that the Missouri Supreme Court referred to the trial court’s uncertainty as to the authenticity of the letter, while the trial court did not appear to rely on authenticity in excluding the letter. On the other hand, the trial judge did say that he rejected the letter because it was unsworn hearsay— “We’re not talking about depositions where a man is under oath, you’re talking about a letter, plain and simple,” (Tr. 2443) — and the state supreme court said more generally that “[w]e uphold his ruling,” which the court said was “about the letter’s reliability.” State v. Brown, 998 S.W.2d 531, 549 (Mo.1999) (en banc). If we were reviewing the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court as though it were an administrative agency, then it may well be that the unclear reasoning of the state court would be inadequate to sustain its judgment on the issue of reliability without further explanation. I understand the court, however, to join our sister circuits in rejecting this model of judicial review, which would tend to “place the federal court in just the kind of tutelary relation to the state courts that the recent amendments are designed to end.” Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.1997); see also Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 159 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc); Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 243 (1st Cir.1999), • Under AEDPA, the question for a federal habeas court is not whether the state court’s opinion is well reasoned, but whether the decision reached in state court proceedings is “objectively unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The rule of reliability established by Green is quite general in nature, and state courts thus have a good deal of leeway in reaching reasonable outcomes. Yarborough v. Alvarado, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2140 , 158 L.Ed. 2d 938 (2004). On this understanding, I agree with the court that the decision of the Missouri state courts to exclude hearsay contained in' an unsworn letter, while perhaps incorrect if reviewed de novo, does not represent an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 348-49 (4th Cir.1996), aff'd on other grounds, 522 U.S. 269 , 118 S.Ct. 757 , 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998); Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 398-99 (6th Cir.2002); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9497062. Public record. Not legal advice.