# Kenneth J. Haugen v. Rochelle Brosseau Puyallup Police Department the City of Puyallup

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · December 5, 2003 · 351 F.3d 372

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9496579

## Case

- **Full name:** Kenneth J. HAUGEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rochelle BROSSEAU; Puyallup Police Department; The City of Puyallup, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** December 5, 2003
- **Citations:** 351 F.3d 372; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 13188; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10459; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24470; 2003 WL 22870971
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Reinhardt
- **Judges:** Reinhardt, Fletcher, Gould
- **Cited by:** 35 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Reversed on other grounds by Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9496579

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, in the Ruby Ridge civil case, that the FBI’s directive to kill any armed adult male was constitutionally unreasonable even though a United States Marshal had already been shot and killed by one of the males
- noting that the plaintiff “ultimately pled guilty to [the] felony [of] . . . ‘driv[ing] his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others[,]’” but that shooting him violated the Fourth Amendment because it was “not clear that h…
- explaining that the failure to discipline theory turned on an argument for subsequent ratification because the failure to discipline could not itself cause the already-completed misconduct

## Opinion text

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join fully in Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the court, on the understanding that officers may not use deadly force against an otherwise nondangerous felony suspect simply because a chase of that suspect, high-speed or otherwise, would become or does become dangerous. Rather, as I understand the controlling law, if a high-speed chase of a nondangerous felony suspect would be, or becomes, dangerous, the officers must terminate the chase. In other words, the chase itself cannot create the danger that justifies shooting a suspect who, under Gamer, may not otherwise be shot. I do not understand the out-of-eir-cuit cases discussed in Judge Fletcher’s excellent opinion and in the dissent to hold otherwise.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9496579. Public record. Not legal advice.