# Jeffrey Goodwin v. Margarette Ghee

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 19, 2003 · 330 F.3d 446

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9496079

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeffrey GOODWIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Margarette GHEE, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** May 19, 2003
- **Citations:** 330 F.3d 446; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 9549; 2003 WL 21157947
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Cole
- **Judges:** Martin, Boggs, Batchelder, Daughtrey, Moore, Cole, Clay, Gilman, Gibbons, Rogers
- **Cited by:** 3 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

COLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although, by vote of the equally divided en banc court, the court today affirms the district court’s judgment dismissing plaintiff Jeffrey Goodwin’s civil rights suit, I write separately because it is my view that Goodwin’s procedural challenge to his parole hearing does not necessarily attack the fact of his conviction or the duration of his confinement. Goodwin seeks only a new hearing before the Ohio Adult Parole Board — not immediate release. Although the duration of Goodwin’s sentence may possibly be impacted by a successful challenge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , the duration of his confinement will not necessarily be affected. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Therefore, I would conclude that § 1983 is the appropriate vehicle for this suit.
Defendants suggested at oral argument that, should Goodwin succeed on his § 1983 claim, he would be entitled to immediate release because his conviction offense level would automatically be decreased from seven to four. This is simply not the case. If he were to succeed on his § 1983 claim, Goodwin would receive “nothing more than a ‘ticket to get in the door of the parole board.’ ” Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C.Cir.1998). Goodwin would not be guaranteed parole or a shorter sentence. See id. at 1056 . Rather, Goodwin would receive a new hearing just as he did when he moved for reconsideration and received a second hearing, and again when the Parole Board decided to reconsider his parole eligibility for a third time.
At this new hearing, the Parole Board would have considerable discretion under Ohio law to determine the appropriate conviction offense level and release date for Goodwin. See Ohio Admin. Code §§ 5120:1-1-07(B), (C). Although Goodwin might receive an offense level of four at this hearing, he could receive a seven, some score in between, or even a higher score. For example, Goodwin could prove his First Amendment claim by showing retaliation, but at the same time fail to demonstrate that the Parole Board fabricated the charge of armed robbery that *449 allegedly caused his score to increase from four to seven. Under this scenario, Goodwin might not receive immediate release. Alternatively, the Parole Board might exercise its discretion to consider factors that it had not considered previously, such as Goodwin’s conduct in prison since June 1999, other conduct not previously considered, or any new recommendations made by the staff of the department of rehabilitation and correction or any of its agencies. See Ohio Admin. Code § 5120:1-1-07(0).
Because Goodwin seeks and, if successful, would receive a new hearing at which the Parole Board would again exercise its broad discretion, I would find that his § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck, 512 U.S. 477 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 . I respectfully dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9496079. Public record. Not legal advice.