# Dean Kent v. Jared Katz, Individually and as a Police Officer for the Town of Colchester

> Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · December 10, 2002 · 312 F.3d 568

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495587

## Case

- **Full name:** Dean KENT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jared KATZ, Individually and as a Police Officer for the Town of Colchester, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- **Decided:** December 10, 2002
- **Citations:** 312 F.3d 568; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 25235; 2002 WL 31757242
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Newman
- **Judges:** Walker, Newman, Kearse
- **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495587

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that federal courts afford prior state court proceedings the same preclusive effect they would have under state law
- stating that a false arrest claim “may not be maintained if there was probable cause for the arrest”

## Opinion text

JON 0. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The Court rules that a police officer does not have immunity as a matter of law from a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest on a criminal charge even though the person arrested was found guilty on his plea of nob contendere to a lesser charge. I join the Court’s opinion, which thoroughly explains why the false arrest claim is not barred by collateral estoppel, but I write to consider briefly the separate issue of whether the claim is barred by a common law immunity that has been absorbed into federal civil rights jurisprudence.
As Judge Kearse’s opinion explains, Vermont police officer Jared Katz arrested Dean Kent for suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol (“DWI”). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State reduced the charge to careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, and Kent entered a plea of nolo contendere and was found guilty.
In Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir.1986), this Court ruled that even though a conviction does not always preclude a claim for false arrest under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, the “common law defense of conviction” does afford an arresting police officer immunity and that such an immunity precludes liability under section 1983 for claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution. Id. at 386-89 . See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 , 491 n. 26 (D.C.Cir.1970); Pouncey v. Ryan, 396 F.Supp. 126, 127 (D.Conn.1975). Cf. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 317-23 , 103 S.Ct. 2368 , 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983) (conviction does not preclude section 1983 claim for unlawful search). In Cameron , however, we described the common law immunity as available in situations where a person “has been convicted of the crime for which he was arrested.” Id. at 387, 388, 389 .
I am not certain whether the common law in general or Vermont’s version of it would extend the defense of conviction to situations where the person arrested is convicted of a lesser charge. There are considerations cutting both ways. On the *578 one hand, it seems somewhat anomalous for the person whose conviction (whether by plea or trial) lawfully subjects him to loss of liberty by imprisonment to obtain damages from an arresting police officer for the usually brief deprivation of liberty caused by an arrest alleged to lack probable cause. On the other hand, if the defense of conviction were not limited to conviction of the crime for which the arrest was made, an arresting officer, anticipating ultimate conviction for a minor offense, could with impunity arrest for major charges that might sometimes subject the person arrested to prolonged pretrial detention. This latter consideration prompted us to rule, in a somewhat analogous context, that a finding of probable cause to arrest on a minor charge does not preclude a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution on a more serious charge. See Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100-01 (2d Cir.1991).
In any event, because Cameron so explicitly stated that the conviction defense applies where a person has been convicted of the crime for which he was arrested, I agree that Kent’s conviction for careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not preclude his claim for false arrest on the DWI charge. What this case illustrates is that prosecutors consenting to reduce criminal charges in exchange for a defendant’s plea should consider including in their agreements at least a settlement, and sometimes a complete release, of related civil liability claims against law enforcement officers. Cf. Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 416 , 107 S.Ct. 1187 , 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987) (rejecting per se invalidity of agreements to release civil claims in exchange for dismissal of all criminal charges); Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d 287, 292 (2d Cir.1989) (“[Ojbtaining a release, which is somewhat analogous to plea bargaining, may be a valid part of the government attorney’s function, even when demanded in exchange for the dropping of criminal charges.”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495587. Public record. Not legal advice.