# Peter Clayton McClendon v. City of Columbia, City of Columbia James R. Carney

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · September 5, 2002 · 305 F.3d 314

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495394

## Case

- **Full name:** Peter Clayton McCLENDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF COLUMBIA; Et Al., Defendants, City of Columbia; James R. Carney, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** September 5, 2002
- **Citations:** 305 F.3d 314; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18318; 2002 WL 2027329
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Jolly
- **Judges:** King, Jolly, Higginbotham, Davis, Jones, Smith, Wiener, Barksdale, Garza, -Demoss, Benavides, Stewart, Parker, Dennis, Clement
- **Cited by:** 558 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495394

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the adoption of the state-created-danger doctrine in six circuits was insufficient to create a robust consensus because the circuits were not unanimous in defining the doctrine’s its “contours” or applying it “to a factual context similar to that of the instant…
- holding that a right may be clearly established based on controlling authority — Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit case law — or " ‘a consensus of cases of persuasive authority' " in other circuits (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999))
- holding that “neither this court nor the Supreme Court has yet determined whether a citizen has a constitutional right to be free from state-created dangers” and because the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary elements of the theory it would not apply even if available
- concluding that, although three other circuits recognized constitutional right, their differing "mental state" requirements did not fairly warn government official of what conduct would contravene that right
- holding that a right may be clearly established based on controlling authority—Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit case law—or “‘a consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” in other circuits (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999))

## Opinion text

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The majority has followed a plausible approach in deciding the qualified immunity issue in this case and I concur in the analysis and result reached. However, I agree with Judge Parker’s very convincing dissent to the effect that the most judicially responsible course for this en banc court to follow would be to decide the specific contours of the “state created danger” cause of action under the Due Process Clause. I regret that the majority of the court has chosen to pretermit the resolution of this question once again, leaving the bench and bar in doubt as to whether and to what extent such a cause of action exists in this circuit.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
joined by RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion but would emphasize two points. First, it is unnecessary for the court to reach any broad pronouncement on the state-created danger theory of § 1983 liability because, at the level of generality represented by the facts before us, no such theory would be viable. This is why it is imperative for courts carefully to address the first question in qualified immunity analysis: whether, under existing law, the plaintiff states a claim for violation of a clearly established federal right
Second, the panel seriously erred by disregarding ten years’ precedents of this court refusing to adopt the theory and instead holding that theory “clearly established” by other circuits’ decisions as of 1993. No matter what was clearly established elsewhere, that theory certainly was not and is not established in this court. Fidelity to circuit precedent demands granting qualified immunity whenever the law in this circuit has remained in flux before and after the events that give rise to a particular claim. Compare Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C.Cir.2001).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495394. Public record. Not legal advice.
