# William Dwight Dotson v. Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director John Kinkela and Margarette T. Ghee

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · August 12, 2002 · 300 F.3d 661

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495289

## Case

- **Full name:** William Dwight DOTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Reginald A. WILKINSON, Director; John Kinkela; And Margarette T. Ghee, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 12, 2002
- **Citations:** 300 F.3d 661; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16153; 2002 WL 1827837
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cole
- **Judges:** Ryan, Boggs, Cole
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495289

## Opinion text

COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Only one legal question is at issue here: whether, as set forth in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 , 93 S.Ct. 1827 , 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for petitioner’s challenge to the scheduling of his parole hearing. I conclude that the writ of habeas corpus does not provide the exclusive remedy for petitioner’s challenge and, for that reason, he may bring a § 1983 action.
The writ of habeas corpus provides the exclusive remedy for challenges that necessarily imply the invalidity of the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646, 648 , 117 S.Ct. 1584 , 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (D.C.Cir.1998); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir.1997). Here, petitioner appeals only the scheduling of his release hearing. Neither outcome of that decision' — -rescheduling the hearing or *667 not rescheduling the hearing — necessarily implies the invalidity of petitioner’s continued confinement. Thus, because petitioner does not challenge a release decision, the writ of habeas corpus is not petitioner’s exclusive remedy and he may challenge it through a § 1983 action. For this reason, I concur in reversing the district court’s dismissal.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9495289. Public record. Not legal advice.