# Jeffrey O'Neal Marshall, a Minor by His Guardian Ad Litem Paul J. Gossens v. Daniel Teske, Alfonzo Morales, and David Kolatski

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · March 27, 2002 · 284 F.3d 765

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9494871

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeffrey O’Neal MARSHALL, a Minor by His Guardian Ad Litem Paul J. GOSSENS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel TESKE, Alfonzo Morales, and David Kolatski, Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** March 27, 2002
- **Citations:** 284 F.3d 765; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 5055; 2002 WL 461380
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Manion
- **Judges:** Manion, Rovner, Evans
- **Cited by:** 46 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9494871

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that officers who did not sufficiently identify themselves to a fleeing suspect, and who unreasonably assumed that the suspect was attempting to evade arrest, were not entitled to qualified immunity
- concluding there was improper provocation of flight where the defendant “did what any sane person would do if he saw masked men with guns running toward him” and ran
- noting that officers cannot assume that a suspect is fleeing from police when a reasonable officer should have known.that the suspect did not realize his pursuers were police officers

## Opinion text

MANION, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Given the appearance and demeanor of the three defendants as they attempted a surprise execution of a search warrant on a suspected drug house, Marshall had good reason to flee. He may not have heard or at least not believed those chasing him were police. However, when determining whether or not a prudent officer in their position would have believed that probable cause existed to support an arrest, we look to the officers’ knowledge at the time of the arrest, not the suspect’s. See United States v. Gilbert, 45 F.Sd 1163, 1166 (7th Cir.1995). The three officers could have reasonably believed that Marshall’s flight meant he was a “lookout” and wanted to separate himself from the crime scene. They could not have known that he did not hear their shouts of “Stop! Police!” nor failed to recognize them as police officers during the pursuit. Therefore, when they caught up with Marshall, a brief detention and search would not have been out of line. By the time everyone caught their breath it should have been obvious Marshall was not acting as a lookout. The uniformed officers were concerned that Teske was possibly a robber with a gun and Marshall ran to them for protection from the apparent robbers. That determination should have ended the episode because, regardless of the identification issue, the undercover officers should have realized that a person who runs to the aid of uniformed police officers could not be knowingly obstructing a police officer. Instead the officers pressed on with a long detention and a bogus charge of obstruction. As I see it, what occurred after the opportunity to get an explanation from the uniformed officers is where the facts justify the jury’s finding of liability, damages and even punitive damages, excessive as they might have been.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9494871. Public record. Not legal advice.