# United States v. Juan Sanchez-Cervantes, AKA Hugo Quirox, Quiroc, Quiroz, Quiroz Trejo, and Quiroz Tapia

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · March 15, 2002 · 282 F.3d 664

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9494810

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan SANCHEZ-CERVANTES, AKA Hugo Quirox, Quiroc, Quiroz, Quiroz Trejo, and Quiroz Tapia, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** March 15, 2002
- **Citations:** 282 F.3d 664
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hug
- **Judges:** Hug, Nelson, Gould
- **Cited by:** 206 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9494810

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that Teague applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petitions and that the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Apprendi does not apply retroactively on initial collateral review
- concluding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) does not apply retroactively on collateral review
- concluding that Apprendi announced a new rule of criminal procedure and therefore does not apply retroactively on initial collateral review
- concluding that “the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Apprendi does not apply retroactively on initial collateral review”
- rejecting retroactive application of Apprendi because Apprendi 'only affects the enhancement of a defendant's sentence once he or she has already been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not rise to the level of importance of' other cases which have been fo…

## Opinion text

HUG, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion because I believe it is compelled by our en banc decision in United States v. Buckland, 277 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc). However, were it not for the majority opinion in Buckland , I would see the case differently. Sanehez-Cervantes was indicted only for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) with no quantity of drugs specified. Thus, the sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C) was applicable. The quantity of drugs found by the judge exceeded the amount the jury could have found under the indictment and instructions to the jury for a violation of § 841(a)(1). In order for the jury to find these quantities the indictment would have to charge violations of § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B) with an appropriate instruction to the jury. As I contended in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Buckland , 1 this would constitute charging and proving to the jury elements of separate crimes. In that circumstance, the Teague analysis would be quite different.
. See United States v. Buckland, No. 99-30285, 2002 WL 63718 , at *11 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2002) (en banc) (Hug, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9494810. Public record. Not legal advice.