# Faye M. Oest v. Illinois Department of Corrections

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · February 14, 2001 · 240 F.3d 605

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493780

## Case

- **Full name:** Faye M. OEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** February 14, 2001
- **Citations:** 240 F.3d 605; 80 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,598; 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 586; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 2151; 2001 WL 122111
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Williams
- **Judges:** Easterbrook, Ripple, Williams
- **Cited by:** 268 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Henry Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Incorporat, 834 F.3d 760 (2016).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493780

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that oral and written reprimands received by employee pursuant to employer’s progressive disciplinary process did not implicate sufficiently tangible job consequences to constitute an independent basis for liability under Title VII, notwithstanding that each reprimand …
- finding that a plaintiff’s “uncorroborated, conclusory statements that similarly situated coworkers were treated differently,” without specific evidence, were insufficient to support a Title VII claim
- holding that oral and written reprimands received under progressive discipline system did not constitute adverse employment action where they did not implicate any tangible job consequences
- noting that "the inference of causation weakens as the time between the protected expression and the adverse action increases,” and that a one-year lapse between the employee's protected expression and the employer’s actions is, by itself, too attenuated to raise an inference …
- explaining that a statement’s “temporal proximity” to the adverse action “is often crucial” when determining whether statement qualified as direct evidence of discrimi‐ nation

## Opinion text

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Oest has not provided sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to support her claim of discrimination. I also agree with the majority that, with respect to Oest’s retaliation claim, the eight-month time lapse between the June 1994 EEOC complaint and the alleged retaliatory actions by the Department is insufficient by itself to support a causal link. However, Oest points to other evidence that, together with the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, is in my judgment sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of causation.
Oest’s theory of causation focuses on the time lapse between her supervisors’ discussion about her EEOC complaint with an internal affairs investigator, and the beginning of the retaliatory actions she alleges. The interview between Lieutenants Pelphrey and Holley and the internal affairs investigator occurred in December 1994. Within days of that interview, Pel-phrey and Holley authored letters critical of Oest. Less than a month after the letters, Oest was disciplined for the van incident. Further incidents of discipline followed, which, after Oest took time off in the summer, continued up through the time of her discharge.
Oest’s theory of causation depends on two assumptions: (1) that Pelphrey, Holley, and her other supervisors first learned of Oest’s EEOC claim when they were interviewed by the internal affairs investigator; and (2) that the supervisor who first disciplined her after she filed her EEOC claim knew she had filed the claim despite the fact that he was not interviewed by internal affairs. 1 Still, there is no evidence contradicting 'these assumptions, and for summary judgment purposes, Oest is entitled to favorable inferences on both of these points.
Because I think that Oest has provided sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor on the issue of whether the 1995 incidents were causally connected to her protected ex *618 pression, I would REVERSE the court’s grant of summary judgment on Oest’s retaliation claim and RemaND for further proceedings, and to that extent, I respectfully dissent.
. The timing of her supervisors' knowledge of Oest’s EEOC complaint is important because her suspensions and discharge are a product of incidents reported by her supervisors, even if they did not have final say on the discipline imposed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493780. Public record. Not legal advice.