# United States v. Richard Perry Curtis,defendant-Appellant

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · January 10, 2001 · 237 F.3d 598

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493715

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Perry CURTIS, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** January 10, 2001
- **Citations:** 237 F.3d 598; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 270; 2001 WL 20761
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Batchelder
- **Judges:** Jones, Batchelder, Clay
- **Cited by:** 556 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493715

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a magistrate judge’s ruling on “dispositive” motions, such as those for summary judgment or the suppression of evidence, must be reviewed de novo by the district court
- holding that a magistrate judge’s ruling on “dispositive” motions, such as those for the suppression of evidence, must be reviewed de novo by the district court
- concluding on the basis of Waters that appellant entitled to remand where district court failed to permit allocution; government in agreement

## Opinion text

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. First, I disagree with the remand of this case to the district court. If the goal of the majority is to articulate the appropriate standard of review of a magistrate judge’s action in regard to a probable cause hearing for an alleged violation of supervised release conditions, that can be accomplished without remand for what almost certainly will be redundant proceedings.
Secondly, and more importantly, I think the majority articulates the wrong standard for the district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s decision. The majority concluded that the district court erred by *606 reviewing the magistrate judge’s decision de novo, rather than for clear error. However, the language of the statute, and the policy it articulates, indicate that de novo review of a magistrate’s determination of probable cause is appropriate.
The majority characterizes the preliminary hearing as a “pretrial matter” under 28 U.S.C. § 686 (b)(1)(A), and reasons accordingly that the district judge should review the magistrate’s findings only for clear error. However, the majority reasons from a faulty premise.
A probable cause hearing regarding a violation of conditions of supervised release necessarily occurs post-trial. Although the determination of a supervised release violation in many ways mirrors a criminal trial, the preliminary hearing afforded a defendant has little in common with the pretrial matters anticipated by § 636(b)(1)(A).
The policy of the Federal Magistrate’s Act, evinced by the legislative record and subsequent case law, is to permit magistrate judges to hear and determine non-dispositive matters while leaving disposi-tive decisions to district judges. The Senate Report that accompanied the Act stated its purpose to retain “the ultimate adjudicatory power over dispositive motions in the district court.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 , 100 S.Ct. 2406 , 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980), quoting S.Rep. No. 94-625, at 10, internal quotation marks omitted. The House Report also articulates the congressional intent, stating that “[t]he ultimate adjudicatory power over dispositive motions ... is exercised by a judge of the court after receiving assistance from and the recommendation of the magistrate.” See Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986), quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1609 at 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6171. Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also supports this distinction between dispositive and non-dispositive matters providing that “[a] magistrate assigned ... to hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense of a party ... shall promptly conduct such proceedings as are required.” Upon objection of a party, the proceedings are subject to de novo review by the district court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Collier v. Gray, 167 F.3d 977 , 980 n. 7 (6th Cir.1999).
In this case, the determination of whether probable cause exists to find a violation of the terms of supervised release is clearly a dispositive question, and should be treated in a manner consistent with the well established policy of de novo review. A finding of no probable cause by a court in regard to a supervised release violation effectively ends the government’s prosecution of the claim. In this way, it is closely akin to a motion to dismiss, or motion for summary judgment and the class of motions specifically excepted by § 636(b)(1)(A) for de novo review. The existence of probable cause to support prosecution is fundamental to the case, and has little in common with a pre-trial discovery matter. The law of this circuit is clear that a magistrate’s decision that functions as a dispositive ruling is subject to de novo review. See United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (6th Cir.l992)(Magistrate’s decision regarding realignment of parties destroyed federal jurisdiction was dispositive and subject to de novo review by district court.).
The fact that the magistrate characterized the probable cause determination as a “decision” rather than a “report or recommendation” is of no moment. It is well established that the judge always retains authority to make the final determination. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152 , 106 S.Ct. 466 , 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)( [The statute] “does not preclude further review [of a magistrate’s decision] by a district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo, or any other standard.”).
*607 Moreover, in the context of this case, the district judge’s finding of probable cause in contravention of the magistrate’s decision was purely a legal determination, and involved no new factual findings. The determination of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and law. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 312 (6th Cir.2000). In the instant case, the judge accepted the facts as the magistrate found them, but reached a different legal conclusion in the application of those facts to the law. This circuit has held en banc that mixed questions of fact and law are treated as questions of law. Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc). Mixed questions, like other conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. See United States v.. Bennett, 170 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 1999) (district court’s conclusions of law regarding denial of motion to suppress reviewed de novo); Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America v. National Labor Relations Board, 120 F.3d 612 , 616 (6th Cir.1997) (administrative board’s conclusions of law reviewed de novo); Raczak v. Ameritech Corporation, 103 F.3d 1257 , 1261 (6th Cir.1997) (district court’s grant of summary judgment reviewed de novo).
Even assuming arguendo that a preliminary hearing on a supervised release violation falls into the category of “pretrial matter” under § 636(b)(1)(A), the statute allows a judge to “reconsider any pretrial matter” where “the magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A), emphasis added. “Clear error” is a term that courts apply to the review of questions of fact. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 694, n. 3 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (“‘Clear error’ is a term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies when reviewing questions of fact”). The determination of whether or not an order is contrary to law is necessarily a purely legal inquiry. The appropriate standard for review is de novo.
Lastly, even assuming that § 636(b)(1)(A) provides the correct standard for a district court’s review of a magistrate’s probable cause determination in a preliminary hearing for revocation of supervised release, and assuming that a defendant can somehow be prejudiced by improper review of such a determination when the district court later determines whether the defendant in fact violated the conditions of his supervised release, it is evident that the district court in this case was “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed.” Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 1985) (so defining the clearly erroneous standard of review). The district court acknowledged that the magistrate rarely made erroneous probable cause determinations. The district court then went on to suggest that in making her probable cause finding, the magistrate judge had “grabbed” a red herring that had been “lofted out there” by defense , counsel. J.A. 109. Although the district court did not invoke the words “clear error,” this statement makes it plain that the court had a firm conviction that the magistrate was mistaken.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493715. Public record. Not legal advice.