# United States v. Juan Rodrigo Gamez-Orduno, Jose Martinez-Carra, Jesus Martinez-Villa

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · December 14, 2000 · 235 F.3d 453

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493679

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Rodrigo GAMEZ-ORDUÑO, Jose Martinez-Carra, Jesus Martinez-Villa, Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** December 14, 2000
- **Citations:** 235 F.3d 453; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 13260; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9936; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31826
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Noonan
- **Judges:** Noonan, Thomas, Berzon
- **Cited by:** 92 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493679

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that Brady applies to pre-trial motions to suppress where there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed
- affirming the district court’s finding that a Brady violation had occurred with respect to withheld evidence bearing on motion to suppress proceedings, i.e., the defendants’ 'Fourth Amendment standing, but further concluding that the district court had adequately cured the vio…
- finding that delayed disclosure of material evidence was cured by granting the 2 defense a two-month continuance to prepare for hearing
- holding that Brady obligations included disclosure of a report that was material to defendants’ standing to pursue a Fourth Amendment suppression motion
- holding that a prosecutor’s letter threatening to seek a superceding indictment established “the context of plea negotiations”

## Opinion text

NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the opinion of the court except as to its holding that Gamez-Ordu-ño and his companions may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
The extension of the Fourth Amendment to overnight visitors reasonably fortifies the right of persons to be secure in their dwellings. The extension embraces those overnight visitors who are the homeowner’s guests. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). Gamez-Orduño testified that he and Martinez-Carra and seven others arrived at the trailer “lying down on the bed in the back” of a pick-up truck driven by a man he did not know. That is not the way *466 guests customarily arrive. Once at the trailer, the backpackers were not told “to make themselves at home.” Instead, they were instructed not to move about and “not to go out at all.” A person under such restrictive orders does not qualify as a guest in any sense of that fairly specific term, except in the obsolete sense of guest meaning “stranger.”
These backpackers were on business when they stopped overnight at the trailer controlled by them confederates. The term “houseguest or overnight guest,” with the suggestion of friendly hospitality, does not fit them. Neither Oscar nor his absent mother treated these men as persons with the special regard that guests customarily receive. No “longstanding social custom” supports putting up a crowd of men, known at most as mules in the criminal business conducted by their hosts. No “functions recognized as valuable by society” were performed by giving the drugs earners a safe house as they carried their drugs.
Nor w'ere the defendants like a businessman in town to do a deal who is put up overnight by an associate. In such a case there is an element of sociability in the accommodation offered and accepted. The guest could have stayed in a hotel; it is a bit of hospitality to take him or her into a home. Here hospitality was not the aim. The trailer provided the necessities of the criminal trip — food and rest so that the refreshed conspirators could continue on to market their wares.
The district court did not err in its factual finding that the travelers were in the trailer “for a purely commercial purpose.” The district court did not err in its legal conclusion that they had no legitimate expectation of privacy recognized by society. The business of these men was to carry marijuana into the United States; that they paused in their journey to gain strength did not mean that they gave up their task. In the trailer, as outside it, they were the carriers of forbidden merchandise. The only expectation that they could have had was to be arrested if they were discovered. That expectation, which was also the expectation of our society, was realized when the Border Patrol arrived.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493679. Public record. Not legal advice.