# Walter Bateman v. United States Postal Service William J. Henderson, 1 Postmaster General, and Aaron Johnson Ben Fukumitsu David Burns Jose Mallari

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · November 2, 2000 · 231 F.3d 1220

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493583

## Case

- **Full name:** Walter BATEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, Defendants-Appellees, and Aaron Johnson; Ben Fukumitsu; David Burns; Jose Mallari, Defendants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** November 2, 2000
- **Citations:** 231 F.3d 1220; 2000 D.A.R. 11
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Alarcon
- **Judges:** Fletcher, Alarcon, Hawkins
- **Cited by:** 550 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493583

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding, in a case where the court granted summary judgment because defendant failed to oppose the motion, that plaintiff would suffer “minimal” prejudice if the judgment were vacated, because “[i]t would have lost [only] a quick victory and, should it ultimately have lost the…
- finding that prejudice to defendant was "minimal" and "insufficient to justify denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(1)" where defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted as unopposed while plaintiff's counsel was away on family emergency, because prejudice consisted only …
- finding that the district court abused its 7 discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b) because the 8 district court did not apply the equitable test adopted in Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 9 F.3d 379 (9th Cir.1997)
- finding “no evidence that [the plaintiff] acted with anything less than good faith,” even where “reason for the delay [in filing wals, admittedly, weak,” as delay “resulted from negligence and carelessness, not from deviousness or willfulness”
- finding length of delay “minimal” where party's 22 counsel “wrote to the court twelve days after it granted summary judgment [as unopposed] 23 and filed his Rule 60(b)(1) motion a little more than one month after the court denied his 24 request to rescind the judgment”

## Opinion text

ALARCON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the district court failed to consider each of the factors set forth in the equitable test we adopted in Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379 (9th Cir.1997), in ruling on Bateman’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion. In Briones , we concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying a Rule 60(b)(1) motion based on the failure of the district court to consider the four factors enumerated in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick As socs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 , 113 S.Ct. 1489 , 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) for determining excusable neglect. In Briones , we vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to the district court to conduct “further proceedings in light of Pioneer and the holding in this case.” 116 F.3d at 382 . We did not presume to engage in the task of “conducting *1226 the equitable analysis” in the first instance, as my colleagues have done in this matter. Maj. Op. at 1224.
Our task as an appellate court in reviewing the denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. See Briones, 116 F.3d at 380 . Our review is deferential. We can reverse only if we determine that the district court abused its discretion in applying the law, or if we conclude that its findings are not supported by the record. See United States v. Washington, 98 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.1996). Here, the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply each of the factors set forth in Briones in determining whether the conduct of appellant’s counsel was excusable. As noted by the majority, the district court failed to make findings regarding “the prejudice to the defendant, the length of the delay, and its potential impact in the proceedings, and whether [appellant’s counsel] acted in good faith.” Maj. Op. at 1224. As the law of this circuit, Briones requires us to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the district court must apply the proper equitable analysis in exercising its discretion. I would have readily joined their number had the majority followed Briones by vacating the judgment and remanding with instructions to the district court to make findings demonstrating that it had applied the proper equitable test.
While conceding that plaintiffs counsel “failed to present any evidence relevant to the four factors,” the majority then proceeds to make its own findings on each of the Briones factors and concludes that Bateman is entitled to Rule 60(b)(1) relief. The majority cites no Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition that an appellate court may substitute its own discretion, based on its independent findings of fact, after determining that the district court erred in “omitting the correct legal standard altogether.” Maj. Op. at 1224. While recognizing that “[a] district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law or rests its decision on clearly erroneous findings of material fact,” Maj. Op. at 1224, the majority has implicitly adopted a novel standard for reviewing a district court’s exercise of its discretion, namely, where the district court fails to make findings of material facts because it has not applied the correct legal standard, an appellate court may make its own findings, 1 and direct the district court to vacate its judgment without conducting an evidentiary hearing as required by the law of this circuit.
By erroneously undertaking to make its own findings of facts, the majority has unfairly deprived the appellees of the opportunity to present evidence regarding each of the Briones factors, and usurped the power of the district court to make factual findings and exercise its discretion, subject, of course, to our review for abuse of discretion. I would follow our decision in Briones and remand for an evidentiary hearing, and instruct the district court to engage in the equitable analysis required by Briones in exercising its discretion. By following the out of circuit authority cited in footnote three of the majority opinion, my colleagues have unnecessarily created an intracircuit conflict with Briones .
. Some of the majority’s factual findings are based upon statements by counsel at oral argument that are outside the record. For example, under the rubric "Facts and Procedural Background” the majority states that "[a]t oral argument before this court, [plaintiffs counsel] explained that he was out of the office on Friday and Monday and that no one called to tell him about the motion.” Maj. Op. at 1222-23.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9493583. Public record. Not legal advice.
