# Sheila Ann Ip v. United States of America Martin Lum

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · March 7, 2000 · 205 F.3d 1168

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492864

## Case

- **Full name:** Sheila Ann IP, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; Martin Lum Respondents-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** March 7, 2000
- **Citations:** 205 F.3d 1168; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 2511; 85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1095; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1825; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3425; 2000 WL 249116
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by O'Scannlain
- **Judges:** Aldisert, O'Scannlain, Hawkins
- **Cited by:** 22 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492864

## Opinion text

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the eloquent and persuasive opinion of the court, which correctly interprets a difficult and opaque statute. I write separately only to note that this is a highly unusual case involving a highly unusual statute, and as such may be of only limited instructional value with respect to the enterprise of statutory interpretation as a whole.
The Supreme Court has instructed us that “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 , 109 S.Ct. 1026 , 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons set forth in the court’s thorough and careful analysis, I believe that the case before us is just such a rare case.
In joining the opinion (including Part III) of the court, then, I am in no way departing from my previously expressed views regarding the proper approach to statutory interpretation in the typical case. See, e.g., Rucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d 627 (9th Cir.2000) (“We begin, as we must, with the express language of the statute .... Where, as here, the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, resort to legislative history is unnecessary.”); Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson. 64 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir.1994); Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.1989) (“In construing a statute, we look first to its plain meaning.”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492864. Public record. Not legal advice.