# Chris Horton and James E. Gardner v. Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County, Etc.

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · February 1, 2000 · 202 F.3d 1297

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492776

## Case

- **Full name:** Chris HORTON and James E. Gardner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FLAGLER COUNTY, Etc., Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** February 1, 2000
- **Citations:** 202 F.3d 1297; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1277; 2000 WL 121124
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Roney
- **Judges:** Tjoflat, Carnes, Roney
- **Cited by:** 53 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492776

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that in McKinney, the plaintiff “did not have a viable federal due process claim” because state law “provided an adequate remedy for the type of procedural deprivation [he] claimed to have suffered, even though he had not taken advantage of that state remedy.” (citi…
- explaining that if a state law remedy exists, a federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction to entertain the state claim, and, accordingly, demonstrating that a state remedy must be grounded in state law
- concluding that plaintiffs failure to pursue state law claim is not dispositive; Fourteenth Amendment only requires that plaintiffs have opportunity to pursue relief in state courts
- stating in dicta that exhaustion and ripeness are not the doctrines in play in assessing whether a procedural due process claim has been stated
- holding that there is no due process violation if the State provides an adequate remedy for the claimed procedural deprivation

## Opinion text

RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my judgment, the district court’s conclusion that removal of the procedural due-process claim was improper while the plaintiffs were in the midst of seeking a remedy in state court was not a jurisdictional determination, but rather, a determination that the plaintiffs had not stated an actionable procedural due-process claim on the merits in accordance with McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). Of course, I agree with the majority’s discussion of McKinney , but I think it is that analysis which undergirds the district court’s decision, even though it was not perfectly articulated in the district court order. I would hold that the district court’s order is reviewable by us on appeal.
In its original order, the district court stated the claim was not properly in its *1303 court and observed that plaintiff was in pursuit of a post-deprivation remedy in state court at the time the suit was removed. The juxtaposition of these two facts is not evidence that the district court read into the McKinney rule a ripeness or exhaustion requirement. Instead, it is an acknowledgment that an adequate state remedy exists. The availability of the state procedure at the time of the pleading defeats the claim even if plaintiffs had not been “in pursuit” through that procedure. The district court’s clarifying order supports this reading. The court “dismissed” plaintiffs’ claim. In my judgment, the district court’s “remand” of the procedural due process claim along with the plaintiffs’ state law claims was nothing more than a reflection that if plaintiff ever could assert a procedural due process claim in keeping with the McKinney rule, it could be asserted in state court, and was not a judgment based on ripeness or exhaustion. I would credit the district court with a proper understanding of McKinney and interpret its less than clear order accordingly. In effect, the district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, a decision on the merits reviewable on this appeal, which I would affirm.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492776. Public record. Not legal advice.