# Wilton Corporation v. Ashland Castings Corporation Ashland Capital Corporation Chimera Corporation, Keith A. Brown

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · August 18, 1999 · 188 F.3d 670

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492410

## Case

- **Full name:** WILTON CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASHLAND CASTINGS CORPORATION; Ashland Capital Corporation; Chimera Corporation, Defendants, Keith A. Brown, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 18, 1999
- **Citations:** 188 F.3d 670; 44 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1035; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19283; 1999 WL 623694
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Gilman
- **Judges:** Wellford, Siler, Gilman
- **Cited by:** 57 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492410

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that there is no need to engage in a choice- of-law analysis when the parties agree on the applicable substantive law
- noting that there is no need to undertake a choice-of-law analysis when the parties agree on the source of substantive law
- observing that we need not conduct a choice-of-law inquiry when there is no dispute on the applicable substantive law

## Opinion text

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur in Judge Wellford’s analysis of both the merits of this case and the issue of sanctions. My disagreement is with the decision to remand the case to the district court for it to determine the proper amount of the sanctions.
There are two reasons to believe that a determination of the appropriate sanctions is an appellate question. First, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states that “If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may ... award just damages and ... costs ...” (emphasis added). Fed. R.App. P. 38. The plain language of the rule does not appear to contemplate a remand. Second, in nine of the ten appellate cases cited in the majority’s opinion in which sanctions were awarded, those sanctions were awarded at the appellate level. See Dallo v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir.1985); NLRB v. Akron Paint & Varnish Co., 985 F.2d 852, 855 (6th Cir.1992); Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir.1993); Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 814 (5th Cir.1988); Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir.1987); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp., Marlyand, 792 F.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C.Cir.1986); Moore v. City of Des Moines, 766 F.2d 343, 346 (8th Cir.1985); Hirschfeld v. Spanakos, 104 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir.1997).
Determining the award of sanctions at the appellate level strikes me as more efficient from the viewpoint of both the parties and the court system. The district court does not possess any more information than do we about the costs that Brown incurred in this appeal. Furthermore, with the district court’s crowded docket and the possibility of still another appeal, it may well take months to dispose of what we could handle in a matter of weeks.
I also question the need for oral argument in a matter such as this, the absence of which would allow us to give as much consideration to this collateral issue as would the district court. In addition, our decision would almost certainly be final. I would therefore be inclined to follow Judge Posner’s approach in Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir.1987), in which the appellee was given 15 days to submit proper documentation to the clerk of the court, and the appellant was given an opportunity to respond.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9492410. Public record. Not legal advice.