# Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States > Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · March 19, 1999 · 170 F.3d 1188 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9491980 ## Case - **Full name:** LEISNOI, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - **Decided:** March 19, 1999 - **Citations:** 170 F.3d 1188; 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21056; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4587; 1999 WL 147368 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Graber - **Judges:** Canby, Graber, Marshall - **Cited by:** 49 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9491980 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that court's silent exercise of jurisdiction does not create binding prece- dent - recognizing sections 2409a(a) & (d) impose conditions upon the waiver of sovereign immunity - recognizing §§ 2409a(a) & (d) impose conditions upon the waiver of sovereign immunity ## Opinion text GRABER, Circuit Judge, specially concurring: I concur in the holding of the majority. The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs action; dismissal, therefore, was proper. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s “conclusion] that a third party’s claim of an interest of the United States can suffice [to support initial jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act] if it clouds the plaintiffs title.” (Slip opinion at 2409.) That conclusion (which presumably is designed to encourage the district court to take jurisdiction if plaintiff files a new action, alleging that the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision clouds title) is inconsistent with the statute and with precedent. § 2409a(a) of 28 U.S.C. confers jurisdiction only over actions “to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest.” (Emphasis added.) The clear implication of that wording is that the dispute must be between the United States and the plaintiff and that the United States must claim the interest on its own behalf. § 2409a(e) provides that, when the United States disclaims interest, jurisdiction ceases. The relevant actor is, again, the United States. Accordingly, the statute does not give a district court jurisdiction over disputes in which any third party, but not the United States itself, claims that the United States has an interest in the property. Even if § 2409a were ambiguous, we are obliged to “constru[e] ambiguities in favor of immunity.” United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 , 115 S.Ct. 1611 , 131 L.Ed.2d 608 (1995). Precedent, too, requires a dispute between the United States and the plaintiff to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act. § 2409a “permits the government to be named as a defendant whenever it claims an interest in real property that is ‘adverse ’ ... to that of the plaintiff.” United States v. Bedford Assocs., 657 F.2d 1300 , 1316 (2d Cir.1981) (emphasis added). See also Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 286 , 103 S.Ct. 1811 , 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (“Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States’ title to real property.”) (emphasis added); Cadorette v. United States, 988 F.2d 215, 223 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that the QTA “authorizes only actions that require courts to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest.... The words of the statute, taken literally, permit adjudications only when the title or ownership of real property is in doubt.”) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted); Lee v. United States, 809 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that, for purposes of the statute of limitations under § 2409a, a claim accrues when the claimants should have realized that the United States had a conflicting claim to the property); Ginsberg v. United States, 707 F.2d 91, 93 (4th Cir.1983) (stating that the plain meaning of the phrase “disputed title to real property” in § 2409a conveys Congress’ intent to include only situations in which the United States claims an interest that “casts doubt on the title or ownership of the property”); Knapp v. United States, 636 F.2d 279, 283 (10th Cir.1980) (stating that, for purposes of the statute of limitations under § 2409a, “[a]ll that is necessary [for accrual] is a reasonable awareness that the Government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiffs”) (emphasis added). The foregoing eases make clear that, for the QTA to confer jurisdiction, the plaintiff and the government must dispute the government’s claimed interest. The reasoning of those cases is persuasive, because the statute limits jurisdiction to property disputes with the United States. In addition to fitting uneasily the statute and precedent, the majority’s approach is ill suited to the premise of certainty that underlies the QTA. The QTA assumes that the district court can tell, by looking at the pleadings, whether it has jurisdiction. The practical consequence of the majority’s approach is to remove that certainty by ereat- *1195 ing a vague distinction between a “bare assertion,” which does not support jurisdiction (slip opinion at 2410), and a “colorable conflict,” id., which does. I have found neither statutory nor precedential support for such a distinction. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result, but not in the majority’s analysis. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9491980. Public record. Not legal advice.