# Andrew Lavern Smith v. Michael Moore, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections Charles Condon, Attorney General, South Carolina

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · March 4, 1998 · 137 F.3d 808

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9491008

## Case

- **Full name:** Andrew Lavern SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael MOORE, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections; Charles Condon, Attorney General, South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** March 4, 1998
- **Citations:** 137 F.3d 808; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3679; 1998 WL 89375
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Motz
- **Judges:** Luttig, Williams, Motz
- **Cited by:** 57 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9491008

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that South Carolina may not invoke capital-specific provisions of AEDPA because petitioner’s habeas corpus petition was finally decided before state’s “mechanism” enacted
- noting that “[i]t is well established that a decision of this Court is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by ... an intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court”
- holding Fourth Circuit precedent is binding until overruled by the United States Supreme Court or an en banc opinion of the Fourth Circuit
- noting that a decision of this Court is no longer binding if called into question by an intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court

## Opinion text

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ,
Circuit Judge, concurring:
If the “physical torture” aggravating circumstance were invalid, see ante section II.B, I could not conclude that the error would not have infected the jury’s decision to sentence Smith to death. However, for the reasons set forth in section II.A of the opinion of the court, I believe the district court correctly instructed the jury as to “physical torture” and the evidence supported the jury’s finding of physical torture. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment and in the opinion of the court, except for section II.B.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9491008. Public record. Not legal advice.