# Mark Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conservation District, Board of County Commissioners for Palm Beach County

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · March 25, 1998 · 133 F.3d 816

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490885

## Case

- **Full name:** Mark BLEDSOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee, Board of County Commissioners for Palm Beach County, Defendant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** March 25, 1998
- **Citations:** 133 F.3d 816; 1998 WL 20868
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hill
- **Judges:** Dubina, Barkett, Hill
- **Cited by:** 117 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490885

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required under Title II of the ADA
- holding that the ADA prohibits “all discrimination by a public entity” regardless of the form it takes
- concluding that employment discrimination claims can be brought pursuant to Title II
- holding that Title II does state a cause of action for employment discrimination

## Opinion text

HILL, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur with reluctance.
In Part IIA, we conclude that the meaning and consequence of an unambiguous written release are subject to dispute, variance and avoidance because we, acting in loco paren-tis, find the adult parties to the contract in need of our patronage. Although troublesome, we apparently have such a role. See Puentes v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 86 F.3d 196 (11th Cir.1996).
In Part IIB, we find that Title II of the ADA (the Act) is carefully drafted to obfuscate. 1 Congress could have said “discrimination in employment” if it had wanted to do so. Here, however, it merely forbids the exclusion of qualified individuals “from ... participating] in or be[ing] denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity” by reason of a disability.
The district judge concluded that the Act forbids discrimination vis-a-vis the “output of these public entities.” See Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Soil and Water Conservation District, 942 F.Supp. 1439 (S.D.Fla.1996). If a constituent is angered by the district judge’s interpretation or our holding today, his or her Congressperson can say “That’s not what we passed. I would never have voted for that! That’s just the work of those activist judges.”
So be it. The legislative power is vested in Congress. By concluding what Congress has done, are we legislating? I hope not.
With a tip of the hat to the district judge, I reluctantly conclude that the flow of precedent is too strong for him or for us to swim upstream, and I
CONCUR.
. The Act resembles the campaign address of a candidate appearing before an audience that was split on a key issue. The candidate observed, "Some of my friends are in favor of this proposition; some of my friends are against it! As for me, I stand four square behind my friends!”

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490885. Public record. Not legal advice.