# Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc., Proposed Intervenor v. United States of America, American Bar Association > Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · July 15, 1997 · 118 F.3d 776 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490474 ## Case - **Full name:** MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOL OF LAW AT ANDOVER, INC., Proposed Intervenor, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee American Bar Association, Defendant-Appellee - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit - **Decided:** July 15, 1997 - **Citations:** 118 F.3d 776; 326 U.S. App. D.C. 175; 1997 WL 391603 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wald - **Judges:** Wald, Williams, Randolph - **Cited by:** 30 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490474 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - noting that the “delay or prejudice” standard referenced in Rule 24(b) captures “all the possible drawbacks of piling on parties; the concomitant issue proliferation and confusion will result in delay as parties and court expend resources trying to overcome the centrifugal for… - noting that consent decree “with res judicata, collateral estoppel, or stare decisis effect might very well affect MSL’s ability to protect its interests,” but because the consent decree had no such effect, MSL’s interest was not impaired - noting that the district court found the proposed settlement to be in the public interest vihere modifications were made to the consent decree subsequent to the public comment period - noting that “untimeliness in seeking intervention may justify its denial without consideration of the merits” - noting, however, that application of the abuse-of-discretion standard seems anomalous in some circumstances ## Opinion text WALD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: I concur in the judgment and in most of the reasoning of the panel opinion. I do want to stress, however, that in my view, the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2) in this case responds to the unusual nature of proceedings under the Tunney Act, Pub.L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16 (b)-(h) (1994)), as well as to the fact that the would-be intervenor here appeals from the denial of a post-judgment intervention motion, and that the applicability of a similar analysis outside of this context should not be assumed. This court long ago observed that the language of Rule 24 required “other than literal application in atypical eases.” Textile Workers Union v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C.Cir.1955) (en banc). I believe that this is such an atypical case, and that we have therefore properly allowed for a somewhat “non-literal” application of Rule 24(b)(2). Thus, I would not expect our opinion to stand for the proposition that the process of appellate review, or of remand for the correction of errors made by the district court, may generally be treated as factors that “delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties” under Rule 24(b)(2). Cf. majority opinion at 782. We treat them as such here so that this court may reserve the discretion to review and correct a district court’s “public interest” determination when the record indicates that the determination is contrary to the dictates of the Tunney Act and a non-party well-situated to demonstrate that this is so seeks to subject that determination to appellate review. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490474. Public record. Not legal advice.