# William Lyle WORATZECK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA BOARD of EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · June 24, 1997 · 117 F.3d 400

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490423

## Case

- **Full name:** 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5300, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8616 William Lyle Woratzeck v. Arizona Board of Executive Clemency
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 24, 1997
- **Citations:** 117 F.3d 400; 97 Daily Journal DAR 8616; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5300; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16266; 1997 WL 366017
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Boochever
- **Judges:** Wallace, Farris, Boochever
- **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490423

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that plaintiff may raise claim that procedural defects in clemency hearing denied him due process rights under section 1983, but noting that the question is “very difficult.”

## Opinion text

BOOCHEVER, J.,
Dissenting and Granting a Temporary Stay of Execution:
I also agree with Judge Moore’s analysis of the federal process due in clemency proceedings. See Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 107 F.3d 1178 (6th Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3756 (May 6, 1997).
Given this clear recognition by the Court of the integral part played by clemency in every state’s death-penalty scheme, we find it only rational to apply Evitts’s principle in equal measure to clemency procedures. We acknowledge at the same time that the due process at the clemency stage will necessarily be minimal, perhaps even *405 barely perceptible, because of the great distance from the truly fundamental process-the trial, the appeal-and the significant distance from other extremely important process-discretionary appeals and post-conviction petitions.
Id. at 1187. The reasoning by which due process places constraints on appeals “logically applies to further proceedings made available by the government, as well,” including clemency proceedings. Id. at 1186 The process due at a clemency proceeding, however, will necessarily be minimal because of its great distance from the trial and other post-conviction remedies. That federal right in any event may be based on Arizona’s holding that, in clemency hearings, “due process of law requires notice and opportunity to be heard, and there must be a hearing in a substantial sense .... in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play.” McGee v. Arizona State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 92 Ariz. 317 , 376 P.2d 779, 781 (1962) (quotations and citations omitted). See State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Superior Court, 12 Ariz.App. 77 , 467 P.2d 917, 920, 922 (1970) (Arizona Superior Court has power to review Board proceedings to determine due process in commutation hearing and may return matter to Board for further proceedings).
I also agree that an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an appropriate vehicle for raising this type of due process claim. If ever a ease presented a significant likelihood of the type of due process violation cognizable in a clemency proceeding, however, this is one. There is no question but that Worat-zeek’s former counsel orchestrated the presentation to the clemency board urging denial of clemency.
Under these circumstances, we should grant a temporary restraining order staying the execution and remanding to the district court to determine whether the conflict of interest undermined the fairness of the clemency proceedings.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490423. Public record. Not legal advice.