# Barbara Coleman v. Houston Independent School District, Anita Ellis

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · May 19, 1997 · 113 F.3d 528

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490282

## Case

- **Full name:** Barbara COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Et Al., Defendants, Anita Ellis, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** May 19, 1997
- **Citations:** 113 F.3d 528; 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,762; 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 697; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11638; 1997 WL 259536
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Garza
- **Judges:** Garza, Smith
- **Cited by:** 633 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490282

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that it is firmly established that individual liability under § 1983 may not be predicated on the vicarious liability doctrine of respondeat superior and that only direct acts or omissions of government officials, not the acts of subordinates, will give rise to individ…
- reversing district court’s order concluding that “a person who gives [an unconstitutional] order and the person who obeys it and takes the action are both responsible and neither is protected by qualified immunity”; court of appeals stated that district court’s view would crea…
- finding that district court erred in endorsing a theory of “respondeat inferior liability” and that employer’s discriminatory intent could not be imputed to employee
- stating that the court lacks jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal to review whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to intentional discrimination
- holding that in review of a grant of summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmovant

## Opinion text

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
The district court committed two fundamental legal errors. 1 First, the “district court assumed, for purposes of summary judgment, that Ellis did not discriminate in *536 tentionally against Coleman,” without considering the evidence before it. By doing so it violated a basic principle of summary judgment law: At the summary judgment stage, we look at the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, not the movant, in this case, Ellis. See Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1996).
Furthermore, by doing so, the district court passed over the only material issue of fact before the district court: “[T]he sine qua non of a constitutional claim of racial discrimination” — the invidious discriminatory animus, if any, of Ellis. Coleman had “to assert a violation of a constitutional right, [that is] Coleman [had to] prove that Ellis intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of race.” Instead, the district court held “that Hornsby’s alleged discriminatory intent could properly be imputed to Ellis, his subordinate.” Obviously, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).” Because I agree with the majority that “a rule of respondent inferior [is] both unprecedented and erroneous,” under Rule 56, it is also not a material issue of fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.”).
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the court.
. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that we have appellate jurisdiction to decide this interlocutory appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). I question, however, the majority's continuous use of “assumed” facts because of the danger it may be misconstrued to pervert basic summary judgment law that requires a summary judgment record. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). Clearly, in Jones , the Supreme Court was referring to the summary judgment record when it stated "the court of appeals can simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason.” See Jones, 515 U.S. at 319-20 , 115 S.Ct. at 2159 ("[W]e hold that a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified-immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial.”)(emphasis added).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9490282. Public record. Not legal advice.