# Torrance Pilgrim v. John Littlefield > Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · August 7, 1996 · 92 F.3d 413 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9489438 ## Case - **Full name:** Torrance PILGRIM, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John LITTLEFIELD, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - **Decided:** August 7, 1996 - **Citations:** 92 F.3d 413; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19788; 1996 WL 441509 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Moore - **Judges:** Norris, Moore, Miles - **Cited by:** 1,016 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9489438 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that a 2 Notably, in that lawsuit, Plaintiff made allegations about, among other things, working with Elon Musk and torture through an “electro Exoforlagagy [sic] Device” and “the Pro Bar.” Makupson, No. 1:24-CV-129 at Doc. 9 at 1. 5 plaintiff must plead and prove that… - explaining that a prisoner must show, “for example, that the inadequacy of the prison law library or the available legal assistance caused such actual injury as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim” - stating that an inmate must show, “for example, that the inadequacy of the prison law library or the available legal assistance caused such actual injury as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim” - holding that a plaintiff must plead and prove that his meritorious claims have been prejudiced by the alleged denial of adequate legal resources to state a claim for denial of access to courts (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)) - holding that a plaintiff must plead that his meritorious claim was prejudiced by the alleged denial of adequate legal resources to state a claim for denial of access to courts (citation omitted) ## Opinion text MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Because I believe that the case law does not support the district court’s disposition of the merits of the prisoners’ claims and that the majority’s holding will result in the unwarranted dismissal of meritorious claims of denial of access to the courts under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 , 97 S.Ct. 1491 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), I respectfully dissent. I I agree with the majority that plaintiffs claiming denial of access to the courts must “prove prejudice stemming from the alleged violation.” The ease before us, however, deals with what plaintiffs must plead, not what they must prove. There is an impor *418 tant difference between these two requirements in Bounds actions, as discussed in the very Supreme Court case on which the majority relies: At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.' And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial. Lewis v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2183 , 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 , 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). This court has never held that a plaintiff claiming denial of access to the courts must plead specific prejudice in the complaint, and we should not do so now. In fact, in Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920 (6th Cir.1985), the only Sixth Circuit case that the district court cited in its decision, we remanded for further proof on the prejudice issue, even though after a seven-week trial “[tjhere [had been] no claim made ... that any particular prisoner was actually impeded in his access to the courts.” Id. at 932 , aff'g in part, rev’g in part, and remanding Walker v. Johnson, 544 F.Supp. 345 (E.D.Mich. 1982). Litigants proceeding pro se are at a disadvantage in the unfamiliar world of law because they lack the specialized training of attorneys. Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.1991). Pro se prisoners with meritorious Bounds claims are therefore doubly disadvantaged; they lack not only legal training, but also adequate legal resources. See Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1385 (6th Cir.1987) (“The claim [the plaintiff] makes is that he has been denied access to the materials that would permit him to learn what the rules of court required of him in order to conduct his case properly. It would be harsh, to say the least, to decline to consider [the Bounds claim] because it was procedurally incorrect, and we decline to do so.”). Of course, a pro se prisoner’s failure to satisfy an easily understood requirement, such as a date for the termination of discovery, deserves no special treatment from the courts. Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 110 . In Jourdan , however, we distinguished between those dismissals based on failure to comply with “readily comprehended court deadlines of which [a plaintiff] was well-aware” and those based, as in this case, on “inartful pleading.” Id. “The drafting of a formal pleading presupposes some degree of legal training or, at least, familiarity with applicable legal principles, and pro se litigants should not be precluded from resorting to the courts merely for want of sophistication.” Id. Given that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit has ever required a plaintiff to plead specific prejudice in a Bounds complaint, the standard that the plaintiffs were expected to satisfy in this case cannot be called “readily comprehended.” The fact that the magistrate judge ordered the prisoners to respond to the Rule 12(c) motion does not alter this conclusion. First, as already discussed, there exists no requirement that Bounds plaintiffs plead specific prejudice, so no response was necessary. Second, the magistrate judge’s order simply indicated that the plaintiffs had until a certain date to respond to the motion; it did not inform them that the only way to cure the supposed deficiencies in their pleading was to seek leave to amend the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). The order therefore did not impart a “readily comprehended” requirement, and prisoners proceeding pro se can hardly be expected to be familiar with the intricacies of federal procedure. I sympathize with the majority’s fear that an overly indulgent attitude towards Bounds complaints may serve to prolong meritless litigation. The holding in this case, however, goes too far in its attempt to avoid this result. By imposing technical legal pleading requirements on Bounds litigants, it not only disregards the Supreme Court’s forgiving attitude towards pro se prisoners’ pleadings *419 but also compounds those disadvantages endured by prisoners who lack adequate legal resources. The goal of weeding out merit-less Bounds suits would be better served by requiring the district court to inform pro se prisoners that they may amend their complaint under Rule 15(a) to cure deficiencies brought to their attention by a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion; if after being so informed the prisoners cannot identify any litigation that suffered as a result of inadequate legal resources, then the district court may dismiss the complaint. The majority’s holding, in contrast, will ensure that many meritorious Bounds suits, as well as meritless ones, fail to advance beyond the pleading stage. II The appellants stated several other claims in their complaint, including a federal claim of deprivation of due process and pendent state claims of conversion and violation of Ohio Revised Code § 5120.131. The district court inexplicably ignored these causes of action in its Rule 12(c) ruling. Because I would reverse on the basis of the Bounds claim alone, however, I see no need to comment on the merits of the other claims. Rather, I would simply instruct the district court to consider them on remand. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9489438. Public record. Not legal advice.