# John Rambo, Claimant-Petitioner v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs Metropolitan Stevedore Company

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · April 10, 1996 · 81 F.3d 840

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9489065

## Case

- **Full name:** John RAMBO, Claimant-Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS; Metropolitan Stevedore Company, Respondents
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** April 10, 1996
- **Citations:** 81 F.3d 840; 96 Daily Journal DAR 4120; 1996 A.M.C. 1384; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2447; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7469; 1996 WL 167660
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Reinhardt
- **Judges:** Reinhardt, Leavy, Browning
- **Cited by:** 10 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Vacated in part, on other grounds by Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9489065

## Opinion text

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I dissent because the issue whether Rambo’s employer is estopped from seeking modification of his $80.16 per week compensation award cannot be decided on the record before us.
Rambo argues that Metropolitan is es-topped from seeking modification pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 922 because its attorney-representative told Rambo before he agreed to numerous stipulations that the stipulated award of $80.16 would be paid to him “for life.” The majority somehow concludes either that (1) Rambo did not rely on the statements of Metropolitan’s attorney or (2) he did not rely on them to his detriment. I do not think the record is sufficiently developed to permit us to reach either conclusion.
If Rambo relied on a promise by Metropolitan of an agreed-upon payment of $80.16 per week for the rest of his life and if he could have established a greater percentage of disability had he proceeded to trial as opposed to stipulating to a 22^% disability, there would be no question that he relied on Metropolitan’s representation to his detriment. Unfortunately, the record before us sheds little, if any, light on the crucial issues: whether Metropolitan’s counsel promised Rambo that he would receive an award that would provide a weekly payment in a fixed amount “for life;” whether, if such promise was made by Metropolitan’s counsel, Rambo relied on it; and, finally, whether Rambo could have established a greater percentage disability if he had pf oeeeded to trial.
According to Rambo, his employer’s attorney did indeed promise him $80.16 per week for the rest of his life. Rambo argues that he agreed to a disability of “22]4%” following the conversation during which the promise was made to him. Before us, as he did below, Rambo contends that he was induced to limit his claim to 22]k% disability and not to proceed to trial by his employer’s .promise of a set payment for life.
The fact that the ALJ’s Statement of Stipulations contained a boilerplate parenthetical phrase — “subject to ... all other provisions of the Act” — that can be construed to subject Rambo’s award to § 922 modification is by no means dispositive of whether Rambo relied on the statements of his employer’s representative to his detriment. Whether Rambo was led to believe that his agreement with Metropolitan would provide indefinite or permanent relief notwithstanding the inclusion of that parenthetical phrase in the stipulation is a factual question that should be remanded to the Benefits Review Board. I would remand the matter for further factual development that would enable the Board to resolve the estoppel issue properly.
Given the majority’s disposition of the es-toppel issue, however, I would agree with my colleagues that the Board erred in terminating Rambo’s benefits rather than modifying them so as to provide for a nominal award. Thus, while I dissent from Section 1 of the majority opinion, I concur in Section 2.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9489065. Public record. Not legal advice.