# Joseph C. Steffan v. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · November 22, 1994 · 41 F.3d 677

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9487569

## Case

- **Full name:** Joseph C. STEFFAN, Appellant, v. William J. PERRY, Secretary of Defense, Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** November 22, 1994
- **Citations:** 41 F.3d 677; 309 U.S. App. D.C. 281; 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 245; 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 33045; 1994 WL 652249
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Buckley
- **Judges:** Mikva, Wald, Edwards, Silberman, Buckley, Williams, Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers
- **Cited by:** 112 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9487569

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “the human sexual drive is enormously powerful and that an open declaration that one is a homosexual is a rather reliable indicator as to the direction of one’s [sex] drive.”
- recognizing the highly deferential standard set forth in Goldman and that “even the First Amendment must yield at times to the exigencies of military life”

## Opinion text

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge,
with whom Circuit Judge RANDOLPH joins, concurring in part:
I agree with the court’s analysis in every respect but one. I cannot concur in its holding, in part III.B., that Steffan lacked standing “to bring his particular challenge to the DOD Directives.”
In his complaint, Steffan acknowledges what he describes as his “homosexual orientation,” notes that there was “no allegation [in the proceedings before the Brigade Performance Board] that [he] had committed any homosexual acts or conduct,” and alleges that his forced separation from the Naval Academy was “predicated solely on [his] sexual orientation” and on laws and regulations that he considers unconstitutional because, among other things, they “punish[ ] his thoughts, speech and status, as opposed to his conduct.” Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 22, 30, & 34. Fairly construed, these allegations amount to a claim that Steffan suffered an injury directly caused by allegedly unconstitutional regulations.
It seems to me that this is sufficient to open the door to the courthouse. Once inside, of course, it was incumbent on Steffan to offer evidence to support his contention that he was required to resign based on his thoughts (or “desires”) rather than on the inferences as to his conduct and intentions that the Board was entitled to draw from the statement, “I am a homosexual.” To say that he failed to prove his contention is surely not to say that he lacked standing to make the attempt.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9487569. Public record. Not legal advice.