# Richard E. Maul v. Dr. Evan Constan, Anthony A. Metzcus and Richard Gore

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 5, 1994 · 23 F.3d 143

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9486704

## Case

- **Full name:** Richard E. MAUL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dr. Evan CONSTAN, Anthony A. Metzcus and Richard Gore, Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** May 5, 1994
- **Citations:** 23 F.3d 143
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Flaum
- **Judges:** Cummings, Eschbach, Flaum
- **Cited by:** 54 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9486704

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that a public purpose was not served because the “[p]laintiff brought suit only on his own behalf, alleging only violations of his own rights” and seeking redress for his injuries only
- concluding that a public purpose was not served because the “[pjlaintiff brought suit only on his own behalf, alleging only violations of his own rights” and seeking redress for his injuries only
- holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny a Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief when the merits judgment was reduced to nominal damages on appeal
- stating that "attorney's fees are not appropriate simply because plaintiff successfully establishes that his constitutional rights have been violated"

## Opinion text

FLAUM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the plaintiffs victory is de minimis so that the only reasonable attorney’s fee is either no fee or a substantially reduced fee. Farrar v. Hobby, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 566, 575 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); Cartwright v. Stamper, 7 F.3d 106, 109 (7th Cir.1993). As we recognized in Cartwright , whether a victory is de minimis for purposes of awarding reasonable attorney’s fees “is generally left for the district court to decide in the first instance.” Id. Here the district court, after weighing the appropriate factors, see Farrar, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 578-579 (O’Connor, J., concurring), concluded that Maul “received more than a ‘technical’ victory or ‘moral’ satisfaction.” Accordingly, the court denied defendants’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion for relief from the previous award of attorney’s fees.
I.
A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. McKnight v. United States Steel Corp., 726 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir.1984). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, this court will reverse “only when no reasonable person could agree with the district court; there is no abuse of discretion if a reasonable person could disagree as to the propriety of the court’s actions.” Id. (citing Simons v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir.1983)). Similarly, this court has held on several occasions that appellate review of attorney’s fees awards is limited' to a “highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Estate of Borst v. O’Brien, 979 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir.1992); see also Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 109 (“[Djistrict courts are granted great discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees ... ”); Libby by Libby v. Illinois High School Ass’n, 921 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir.1990) (“This court has- a limited focus when reviewing a district court’s ruling on a fee petition.”). As the Libby panel explained, the fee determination “rests within the sound discretion of the district court because that court is particularly well-qualified to make the partially subjective findings necessary for an award of fees and to perform the balancing of equities that is an integral part of the proceeding for an award of fees.” 921 F.2d at 98 . Consequently, as with a Rule 60(b) motion, a decision on attorney’s fees will be set aside only where no reasonable' person could take the view adopted by the trial court. Id. (citing Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 696 (7th Cir.1985)).
II.
Farrar is the obvious starting point for an assessment of whether any reasonable person could have concluded that Maul was entitled to attorney’s fees. Under Farrar , there is no question that a civil rights plaintiff recovering only nominal damages qualifies for prevailing party status under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 .- -U.S.-,-, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). However, “[i]n some circumstances, even a plaintiff who .formally ‘prevails’ under § 1988 should receive no attorney’s fees, at all.” Id. at-, 113 *148 S.Ct. at 575 . “A plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but receives no more than nominal damages is often such a prevailing party,” and in such circumstances “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. (emphasis supplied). In determining whether a particular case is a “usual” one, district courts must consider the three factors explicated in Justice O’Connor’s Farrar concurrence: (1) the difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed; and (3) the public purpose served by the litigation. At- -, 113 S.Ct. at 578-579 ; see also Cartwright, 7 F.3d at 109 (applying these factors).
In my view, neither Justice Thomas’ opinion for the Court nor Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Farrar evince a talis-manic approach, either in tone or substance, to the question presented here. Rather, as the district judge recognized, Farrar raises a rebuttable presumption that attorney’s fees are inappropriate when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages. In some cases, however, attorney’s fees are appropriate because “[njominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory make.” Farrar , — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 578 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, despite this presumption, “reasonableness” remains the touchstone of the attorney’s fees inquiry. See Farrar, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 575 (noting the court’s “central” responsibility to make the assessment of what is a reasonable fee under the circumstances); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 , 109 S.Ct. 939, 945-46 , 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (same). Indeed, in view of the text of § 1988 and the policies behind it, it is not surprising that “reasonableness” and “discretion” are the hallmarks of the fee determination. The final sentence of § 1988 provides as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,1982,1983,1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (emphasis supplied). In construing this statute, the Court has noted the countervailing policy considerations implicated by the availability of attorney’s fees in some cases. Section 1988 “is a tool that ensures the vindication of important rights, even when large sums of money are not at stake, by making attorney’s fees available under a private attorney general theory,” but it is not “a relief Act for lawyers” who accomplish no public goal “other than occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and client.” See Farrar, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 578 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The task of weighing the Farrar factors in the context of these policies results in an inherently subjective determination of the propriety of attorney’s fees and is best performed by the district court “in light of its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’” Estate of Borst, 979 F.2d at 514 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 , 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).
Unlike the court below in Farrar , the district court here did not simply calculate Maul’s fee award “without engaging in any measured exercise of discretion.” — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 575 . On the contrary, the district court opinion explicitly recognized that Farrar “limited the circumstances in which attorney fees may be awarded under § 1988 to a plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages.” Mem.Op. at 7. The district court properly applied the Farrar factors and determined that this case was sufficiently unlike Farrar to warrant a fee award. First, the court recognized that although Maul and Farrar recovered an identical amount in real terms — one dollar — the difference between the recovery sought and the judgment recovered here was “not as glaring as the difference in Farrar v. Hobby.” Mem. Op. at 6. Second, the court determined that the legal issue on which Maul prevailed— whether the Constitution requires a hearing before the State may forcibly administer psychotropic medication to a prisoner against his will — was significant, especially in light of a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 , 110 S.Ct. 1028 , 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990), that reached the same conclusion. Finally, the court found that Maul’s suit achieved an important public goal because it reinforced the rights of *149 other inmates by helping to deter defendants from future instances of noncompliance with their own regulations. Mem.Op. at 7.
In reviewing the fee award, the majority correctly identifies the first and second factors as the most and least important respectively. Accordingly, I have no quarrel with the conclusion that Maul’s recovery of a small fraction of what he sought militates more strongly against the fee award than the significance of the right vindicated persuades in favor of such an award. 1 With respect to the third factor, however, I must depart from the majority’s approach. After reviewing what Maul asked for and what he received, the majority concludes that the fee award was an abuse of discretion because Maul failed to either prove actual injury (entitling him to compensatory damages), obtain an injunction, or receive an award of punitive damages. Opinion ante at 147. While any of these forms of redress would strongly support a fee award, I do not believe an award necessarily is unreasonable in their absence. The district court concluded that Maul’s suit had served an important public purpose by potentially deterring future violations. The majority deems this argument “conjectural”, opinion ante at 146, because Maul waived his original request for an injunction following the filing of an Agreed Entry with respect to conditions and practices at the Westville Correctional Center. See Anderson v. Orr, No. S83-0481 (N.D.Ind.) (filed January 13, 1989). I do not believe that this Agreed Entry and Maul’s resulting failure to seek or obtain an injunction let defendants off the hook so easily. Maul’s suit alleged that defendants failed to follow their own regulations. Defendants claim that “if anything, it was the results achieved in a different lawsuit [Anderson v. Orr ], not the case at bar, that made any kind of lasting impact on overall conditions or practices of Defendants.” Br. at 15. Yet the Agreed Entry in Anderson denies that any constitutional violations had occurred at Westville and reflects the view that the Due Process Clause is satisfied by a physician’s individual determination that forced medication is appropriate. Both of these positions were rejected by the district court as a result of Maul’s suit. 2 Thus, while it is true that injunctive relief would have given Maul a legally enforceable right beyond his right to the one dollar in damages, I believe that the district court’s conclusion that Maul’s suit likely deterred future violations is more than mere conjecture. Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 , 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2676 , 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987). (“[Rjelief need not be judicially decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988.”).
The majority further concludes that attorney’s fees are inappropriate here because the deterrent effect of Maul’s suit — “whether it is ‘merely conjectural’ or slightly more than that” — was no greater than the nominal deterrence caused by the petitioner’s victory in Farrar . Opinion ante at 146 n. 3. Respectfully, I cannot agree that the holding of Farrar cabins our discretion to chart a different course in this case. In rejecting the possibility that the deterrent effect of Far-rar’s suit served an important public purpose, Justice O’Connor wrote,
[0]ne searches in vain for the public purpose this litigation might have served. The District Court speculated that the judgment, if accompanied by a large fee award, might deter future lawless conduct, see App. to Pet. for Cert. A23-A24, but did not identify the kind of lawless conduct that might be prevented. Nor is the conduct to be deterred apparent from the verdict, which even petitioners acknowledge is “regrettably obtuse.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Such a judgment cannot deter misconduct any more than a bolt of lightning can; its results might be devastating, *150 but it teaches no valuable lesson because it carries no discernable meaning.
Farrar , — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 578-579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Here, by contrast, the district court expressly found that Maul, by vindicating his own constitutional rights, advanced the important public purpose of forcing defendants to provide due process hearings pri- or to forced medication (as provided for in the Indiana Department of Corrections regulations) rather than merely relying on a physician’s individual determination that such medication was appropriate (as permitted under the Agreed Entry). Moreover, the district court specifically noted that “[a]n award of attorney fees may help to deter the defendants from similar noncomplianee with then-regulations in the future.” Mem.Op. at 7. In their reply brief, defendants characterize the possible deterrent effect of Maul’s suit as “pure speculation.” Rep.Br. at 5. Yet, in the very next paragraph, defendants admit that they “may well chose [sic ] to adhere to the boundaries suggested by the district court’s analysis out of a desire to avoid future lawsuits or simply out of recognition that the district court was correct.” Id. While defendants are correct in asserting that their conformity to the district court’s standards may not have been judicially compelled, then-concession lends support to the view that Maul’s victory, unlike Farrar’s, had a significant deterrent effect.
III.
The district court, weighing the appropriate factors, determined that a fee award was reasonable in this case because (1) the difference between the recovery sought and the judgment recovered was not as glaring as that in Farrar ; (2) plaintiff prevailed on a significant legal issue — “the right to resist the administration of mind altering drugs,” Harper, 494 U.S. at 238 , 110 S.Ct. at 1045 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and (3) plaintiffs suit accomplished the public goal of forcing defendants to abide by their own regulations regarding involuntary medication. The majority rejects the district court’s conclusion with respect to (3), and, as a result, reverses the fee award as an abuse of discretion. In my view, the majority has adequately explained why it would not have awarded attorney’s fees to Maul, but it has not demonstrated that the district judge’s contrary decision was an abuse of discretion. Cf. Monsanto Company v. E.P.A., 19 F.3d 1201, 1210 (7th Cir.1994) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Because I cannot conclude that “no reasonable person could agree with the district court,” Libby by Libby, 921 F.2d at 98 ; McKnight, 726 F.2d at 335 ,1 respectfully dissent. I would affirm the denial of defendant’s motion for relief from the previous judgment of attorney’s fees.
. I do think, however, that the majority understates the importance of the second factor by concluding that it only "minimally” advances Maul's case. Opinion ante at 146.
. This case therefore is distinguishable from Willis v. Chicago, 999 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied,-U.S.-•, 114 S.Ct. 879 , 127 L.Ed.2d 74 (1994), in which the change in policy sought to be affected by the lawsuit — recision of the city’s extended detention policy — took place approximately six months before plaintiff filed suit. Here, by contrast, plaintiff's complaint predates the Agreed Entry by fourteen months and the court's finding of a constitutional violation by nearly two years.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9486704. Public record. Not legal advice.