# Doe Ex Rel. Magee v. Covington County School District

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · March 23, 2012 · 675 F.3d 849

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9485589

## Case

- **Full name:** Jane DOE, a Minor, by and Through Her Next Friends, Daniel MAGEE and Geneva Magee; Daniel Magee, Individually and on Behalf of Jane Doe; Geneva Magee, Individually and on Behalf of Jane Doe, a Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COVINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, by and Through Its Board of Education and Its President, Andrew KEYS and Its Superintendent of Education, I.S. Sanford, Jr.; Covington County Superintendent of Education, I.S. Sanford, Officially and in His Individual Capacity; Covington County Board of Education, by and Through Its President, Andrew Keys; Andrew Keys, Officially and in His Individual Capacity; Tommy Keyes; Other Unknown John Doe and Jane Doe Education Defendants A-Z, in Their Official and Individual Capacities, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** March 23, 2012
- **Citations:** 675 F.3d 849; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6080; 2012 WL 976349
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Jolly
- **Judges:** Jones, King, Jolly, Davis, Smith, Wiener, Garza, Benavides, Stewart, Dennis, Clement, Prado, Owen, Elrod, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson
- **Cited by:** 512 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9485589

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating the Court’s task on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is “to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success”
- noting that a public school does not have a DeShaney “special relationship with a student that would require the school to protect the student from harm at the hands of a private actor” and that for the state-created danger exception to DeShaney to apply requires, among other …
- describing the police officers in Kneipp as having “sent” the victim home alone, but recasting parents‟ allegation that a that is not necessarily helpful to safeguarding constitutional rights. 26 school released their child to an unauthorized person in violation of school poli…
- affirming the district court’s finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and explaining that “[b]ecause we determine that the Does have failed to state a violation of [their child’s] constitutional rights, we need not further consider the qualified immuni…

## Opinion text

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I fully concur with the thorough and comprehensive opinion of Judge King. I specially concur, however, to underline the stubborn fact that the issue of whether a special relationship can be created between a school and its students has been before the en banc court three times and three times we have said the same thing. As this en banc court makes clear, the other two en banc cases, Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc), and Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School District, 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), were not only fully consistent with one another — and their authority undiminished before this en banc court occurred — but now the combined authority of all three en banc cases affirms and makes unambiguous the rule of this court to be: We “strictly” construe DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), to hold that, “only when the state, by its affirmative exercise of power, has custody over an individual involuntarily or against his will, does a ‘special relationship’ exist between the individual and the state.” Walton, 44 F.3d at 1303 (emphasis in original). Walton and Hillsboro are not just clear, they are emphatically clear that a special relationship under DeShaney “only arises” between the state and an individual when the individual “is involuntarily confined or otherwise restrained against his will pursuant to a governmental order or by the affirmative exercise of state power”; it “does not arise solely because the state exercises custodial control over an individual.” Id. at 1299. When a person claiming the right of state protection is voluntarily within the care or custody of a state agency, such as a schoolchild who voluntarily subjects himself or herself “to the rules and supervision of [] School officials,” any “willful relinquishment of a small fraction of liberty simply is not comparable to that measure of almost total deprivation experienced by a prisoner or involuntarily committed mental patient.” Id. at 1305 (emphasis added). Expanding state liability for the acts of private persons can make constitutional sense only if the state has “effectively taken the plaintiffs liberty under terms that provide no realistic means of voluntarily terminating the state’s custody and which thus deprives the plaintiff of the ability or opportunity to provide for his own care and safety.” Id. (emphasis in original). There is no room — not an inch — for confusion. The law yesterday and today is bare and bald: No DeShaney special relationship exists between a public school and its students. Absent a special relationship, any analysis of the defendant’s conduct as deliberately indifferent to the rights of the student is, under DeShaney , irrelevant.
No further panel of this court should require us to iterate these clear statements of the law a fourth time.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9485589. Public record. Not legal advice.
