# State of Ohio v. United States Environmental Protection Agency > Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · July 20, 1993 · 997 F.2d 1520 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9484472 ## Case - **Full name:** STATE OF OHIO, Et Al., Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Et Al., Respondents - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit - **Decided:** July 20, 1993 - **Citations:** 997 F.2d 1520; 302 U.S. App. D.C. 318 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Randolph - **Judges:** Mikva, Edwards, Randolph - **Cited by:** 48 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9484472 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that "institutional controls (such as fences and deed restrictions)" might be used "as a sole remedy at Superfund sites" so long as they "meet the threshold requirement of protectiveness" of human health and the environment - noting that “the statute . . . require[s] that remedial actions at Superfund sites result in a level of cleanup or standard of control that at least meets the legally applicable or otherwise relevant and appropriate federal (or stricter state) requirements,” particularly the “… - noting that "the statute ... require[s] that remedial actions at Superfund sites result in a level of cleanup or standard of control that at least meets the legally applicable or otherwise relevant and appropriate federal (or stricter state) requirements," particularly the "le… - noting that the fact that § 9621(b)(1) "mandates the achievement of multiple goals" precludes an interpretation requiring the EPA to "select[] . . . permanent remedies whenever possible," because that interpretation would read the "mandate to select cost-effective remedies" ou… - noting that the "statutory language [of § 9621(b)(1)] places as much emphasis on the selection of cost-effective remedies as it does on the selection of permanent remedies" ## Opinion text RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring: With respect to the issue discussed in Part V.A of our per curiam, opinion, I believe EPA may retain exclusive remedial and enforcement authority without running afoul of CERCLA. I join this portion of today’s opinion because the current NCP fails to provide a reasoned explanation for categorically denying states the right to apply to exercise enforcement and remedy selection authority pursuant to § 104(d)(1)(A) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (d)(1)(A). But I see no problem with EPA imposing such a categorical restriction so long as the Agency provides an adequate justification for doing so. Section 104(d)(1) gives the President unlimited discretion to determine whether a *1551 state is capable of carrying out CERCLA enforcement actions. Under section 104(d)(1)(A), if the President determines that a state has the capability to carry out CERCLA authority, the President “may” enter into a cooperative agreement with the state. Furthermore, such “contract or cooperative agreement ... shall be subject to such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe.” 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (d)(1)(B). The President can always refuse to grant states enforcement authority after receiving their applications. It follows that EPA can announce beforehand that it will never enter into any agreements depriving EPA of final approval over remedy selection. The regulations already contain numerous conditions on approval of state applications. See 40 C.F.R. § 36.600 et seq. These conditions do not prevent states from applying to enter into cooperative agreements; they simply inform the states that their applications will not be considered unless those conditions are met. The states, in other words, can apply for anything they want, but EPA may decide that there are some things they just will not get, ever. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9484472. Public record. Not legal advice.