# Carol L. Kirchner GAFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · June 18, 1993 · 997 F.2d 150

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9484420

## Case

- **Full name:** 62 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 205, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,451 Carol L. Kirchner Gafford v. General Electric Company
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 18, 1993
- **Citations:** 997 F.2d 150; 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,451; 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 205; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14766; 1993 WL 210535
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Ryan
- **Judges:** Jones, Ryan, Peck
- **Cited by:** 491 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9484420

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a survey of case law revealed at least three different burdens of proof; "(1) the defendant must prove, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff’s claims are not less than the federal amount-in-controversy requirement; (2) the defendant must prove, 'more likely…
- recognizing that a party’s affirmative and explicit concession that the amount in controversy requirement is met may be sufficient in some cases to establish that requirement
- noting, in dicta, the conflict among the circuits in various removal cases and the use of the “reasonable probability” or “substantial likelihood” standard in some district courts when the plaintiff has specifically claimed less than the federal amount-in-controversy requireme…
- holding that “a petition for removal may be amended under the same considerations governing the amendment of any other pleading containing jurisdictional allegations”
- holding that it was not error to “guid[e] the jury through a three-stage order of proof as opposed to instructing solely on the ultimate issue of sex discrimination”

## Opinion text

RYAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in my brother’s opinion, and in most of the underlying analysis. I do not think, however, that it is necessary to address the burden of proof issue with respect to the district court’s jurisdiction, as my brother has done in parts III— A and B of his opinion.
There is no question on this record that plaintiffs counsel conceded at the jurisdiction hearing in the district court that the amount in controversy was over $50,000:
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Judge, I wish, I wish I could accomodate [sic] you so that you could remand it. However, I can’t now that we have the figures. I believe that that evidence, being of record before the court, completes the amount in controversy.
THE COURT: And what is the amount in controversy?
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Judge, I haven’t calculated it at this point in time, but I think what the number is, the differences between the twenty-seven that Mrs. Gaf-ford made as a maximum, and the fifty-six, if, if in fact we’re looking at almost thirty difference in that point in time. And I can see where a jury might find at least two years, it looks like the amount in controversy, since GE has provided us with that figure.
Moreover, at oral argument before this court, in response to a question asked by the presiding judge, plaintiffs counsel conceded that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000.
I would hold for another day, in a case in which the requisite jurisdictional amount in a diversity of citizenship case remanded to a federal court is not conceded, a discussion and decision concerning the burden of proof on that issue.
That said, I concur in the judgment for affirmance.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9484420. Public record. Not legal advice.