# United States v. Eddie Louis Taylor

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · February 10, 1992 · 956 F.2d 572

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9482600

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Louis TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** February 10, 1992
- **Citations:** 956 F.2d 572; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1668; 1992 WL 19468
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Martin
- **Judges:** Merritt, Keith, Kennedy, Martin, Jones, Milburn, Guy, Nelson, Ryan, Norris, Suhrheinrich, Krupansky
- **Cited by:** 89 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9482600

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a factfinder's choice between two permissible views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous

## Opinion text

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I join in Judge Keith’s dissenting opinion and write separately to express my personal belief that the result reached in this case is constitutionally unsound. The majority sanctions unreasonable airport searches as a short-term solution to what has not yet proven to be the long-term problem of a country awash in easily obtainable drugs.
In its war on drugs, the majority has endorsed an airport stop-and-search policy based on hunch and whim rather than any reasonable level of suspicion. I could accept a rule that would, without exception, subject everyone and everything to a stop and a search upon entry to or exit from an airport. I could even accept a rule under which every tenth entrant was stopped. Either of these rules could be clearly articulated and administered in a manner such that everyone who travelled would be treated in the same fashion. Under either of these systems, anyone who travelled would be aware of the objective standard, whether the person was travelling for legal or illegal purposes. What I cannot accept is the purely subjective standard adopted by the majority, which in the present case permits a stop and a search based on race.
The crucial question in this case is the limitation on the power to control freedom of movement. I have never lived under an authoritarian government. I have always believed that freedom from fear of unwarranted governmental intrusion as well as the right to criticize without fear are the cornerstones of a free society. History bears witness to the fact that authoritarian regimes always arise from the executive branch of government rather than the legislative or judicial. Abuse of individual rights by the executive is controlled to a great extent by fear of exposure. With a degree of success, our society regulates the executive through detached, independent and fair-minded review by the judiciary. Here, the majority abdicates this responsibility in favor of expediency, representing once again, the aggrandizement of community rights at the expense of individual freedoms.
When I travel, I am typically attired in a suit and tie and behave in a conventional manner. I doubt that I attract much attention from the airport police, even though I may exhibit signs of nervousness or agitation due to turbulence during a flight or a difficult connection. I face little, if any, possibility of being stopped. Perhaps it is my dress and manner; I believe that it is these factors combined with the fact that I am white. In stark comparison, Mr. Taylor’s deplaning begins a long journey down the slippery slope to the past. The police officers testified that Mr. Taylor exhibited signs of nervousness and agitation. It is apparent that because of his race and his clothing in addition to his nervousness, Taylor was singled out as he deplaned.
In reviewing the transcript of the hearing before the district court, I can see no evidence of personal animosity on the part of the airport officers. In fact, the evidence seems to reveal officers attempting to carry out their duty. What they did testify to and what I object most strenuously to is the poor training, the poor guidance, and the absolute inability on the part of the officers to articulate a reason for the *591 stop and search of Mr. Taylor, other than the relative appearance of his clothing, the fact that he was travelling from Miami to Memphis, and the fact that Mr. Taylor is a black American. This is simply impermissible, even under the weakened and eroded state of the Fourth Amendment.
Good investigation pays off in fair and prompt convictions. Once again, however, our en banc court fails to recognize that we are sliding backwards. See United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1328 (6th Cir.1991) (en banc). Under the majority’s indefinite standard, it is difficult to discern a scenario where we could find unreasonable, a stop and a search of any non-white person leaving a plane from Miami. Under the majority’s standard, would the stop and search be unreasonable if the non-white person was well-dressed and carrying luggage, but appeared nervous and agitated? Would the stop and search be unreasonable if that non-white person was shabbily dressed and carrying luggage, but appeared less nervous than Taylor? What if the non-white person was well-dressed and appeared less nervous than Taylor, but was carrying no luggage? The absurdity of these questions reveals the frightening potential for abuse of the majority’s standard. When race is combined with dress characteristics as the means of determining who is to be searched, I believe this squarely violates the Fourth Amendment. Some might argue that Taylor’s subsequent conviction weakens my argument, but Taylor’s ultimate guilt is not the issue. Guilt is never the issue in Fourth Amendment analysis. I believe that the majority’s unarticulated, indefinite standard opens the door to abuse. In turn, I believe the growth of this abuse will result in the repetition of our not-too-distant history when only some members of our society were able to travel without fear of unwarranted governmental intrusion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9482600. Public record. Not legal advice.