# United States v. William J. Benson

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · January 14, 1992 · 941 F.2d 598

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9481943

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William J. BENSON, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** January 14, 1992
- **Citations:** 941 F.2d 598; 1991 WL 164449
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Kanne
- **Judges:** Manion, Kanne, Fairchild
- **Cited by:** 118 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Modified by United States v. William J. Benson, 957 F.2d 301 (1992).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9481943

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding IRS agent testimony was in violation of helpfulness requirement where “[the agent] had nothing to offer on this question that would assist the jury’s understanding of the issue”
- rejecting expert testimony regarding the purpose of a *1078 transaction because “[m]uch of ■ [the expert’s] testimony consists of nothing more than drawing inferences from the evidence that [the expert] was no more qualified than the jury to draw”
- noting that “[a]n expert’s opinion is helpful only to the extent the expert draws on some special skill, knowledge, or experience to formulate the opinion”

## Opinion text

KANNE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In typical fashion for a tax case, the government called an expert to summarize the complex evidence it had presented in its case in chief. “The nature of a summary witness’ testimony requires that he draw conclusions from the evidence presented at trial.” United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213, 218 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 , 96 S.Ct. 3166 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1184 (1976). A summary witness need not necessarily be an expert, but experts in ae-counting and other disciplines regularly give summary evidence of the sort envisioned by Federal Rule of Evidence 1006. 5 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 599, at 540 (1981). See, e.g., United States v. Kapnison, 743 F.2d 1450, 1557-58 (10th Cir.1984) (under Rule 1006, IRS agent allowed to give testimony summarizing exhibits and testimony), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 , 105 S.Ct. 2017 , 85 L.Ed.2d 299 (1985); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1346-50 (D.C.Cir.1983) (under Rule 1006, FBI agent who was Certified Public Accountant allowed to summarize bank transactions and testimony of witnesses), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 , 104 S.Ct. 2678 , 81 L.Ed.2d 874 (1984).
In a case strikingly similar to the present one, we held that “[ejxpert testimony by an IRS agent which expresses an opinion as to the proper tax consequences of a transaction is admissible evidence.” United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 581 (7th Cir.1986). We also noted that “an IRS expert’s analysis of the transaction itself, which necessarily precedes his or her evaluation of the tax consequences, is also admissible evidence.” Id.
With regard to the expert testimony admitted by a district judge, we are required to sustain his decision unless it was manifestly erroneous. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 , 82 S.Ct. 1119, 1122 , 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962). The key transaction in this case concerns whether or not the payments received by Benson from the insurance company and Social Security Administration were fraudulently obtained— thus making such payments taxable income.
In light of the language in Windfelder, 790 F.2d at 581 and United States v. Toushin, 899 F.2d 617 , 620 n. 4 (7th Cir.1990), I do not believe that permitting the government’s expert witness to testify concerning his analysis of the transaction (pay *616 ment of insurance and Social Security benefits), which necessarily preceded his evaluation of the tax consequences could be deemed manifestly erroneous. It is certainly arguable that an IRS agent could qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, and training to give an opinion on the existence of fraud for the purpose of determining taxable income. The wide discretion afforded the district judge should enable him to determine whether the transaction analyzed by the IRS agent fell within the purview of his expertise.
Even if a finding of manifest error could be made with regard to the admission of the expert’s summary testimony, I disagree with the majority’s rejection of the application of the harmless error doctrine. The district judge initially made a determination that any error he may have made in admitting the agent’s testimony was harmless. In determining whether the district judge committed manifest error, we must necessarily address this harmless error determination, as it was incorporated into the decision to allow the testimony to remain in evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the conviction.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9481943. Public record. Not legal advice.