# United States v. Paul A. Bilzerian > Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · January 3, 1991 · 926 F.2d 1285 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9481371 ## Case - **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Paul A. BILZERIAN, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - **Decided:** January 3, 1991 - **Citations:** 926 F.2d 1285; 31 Fed. R. Serv. 1185; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 66; 1991 WL 430 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Winter - **Judges:** Lumbard, Cardamone, Winter - **Cited by:** 607 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by United States v. John C. Mandanici, Jr., 205 F.3d 519 (2000). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 1 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9481371 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the waiver principle was applicable in the case before it as to the appellee’s testimony that he thought his actions were legal because that testimony put his knowledge of the law and the basis for his understanding of what securities law required at issue and bec… - recognizing an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to "matters reasonably related to those introduced in direct examination,” and citing cases in which an affirmative defense was *405 asserted as examples of the privilege holder asserting "a claim that in fairne… - finding that defendant’s testimony about his understanding of his action’s legality, based on otherwise privileged conversations with counsel, was probative of criminal intent, a material issue, and therefore made conversations discoverable through cross-examination - holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony regarding federal securities regulations where the expert “did not give his opinion as to whether [the defendant’s] actions violated the securities laws” ## Opinion text WINTER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in Judge Cardamone’s disposition of the attorney-client privilege issue. I also concur in the affirmance of the convictions based on violations of the securities laws. Although he is an estimable scholar, I believe that much of Professor Coffee’s testimony was inadmissible. These portions consisted largely of legal opinions that should have been explored solely in the court’s instructions to the jury. Moreover, the defense expert, Lee B. Spencer, a former Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance, was prevented by the court from answering questions that were in principle indistinguishable from those answered by Professor Coffee. Nevertheless, Professor Coffee’s testimony did not deviate in substance from the instructions given by the court to the jury and did not contain any matter that might otherwise prejudice the jury. I believe, therefore, that whatever error occurred was harmless. With regard to the redirect examination of Murphy regarding Bilzerian’s personal tax return, I believe that the redirect examination was improper. The cross-examination of Murphy by Bilzerian’s counsel concerned the partnership returns only and merely established that the source of Bilze-rian’s funds was irrelevant to the partnership tax returns. In no way did this cross-examination open the door for questions regarding Bilzerian’s personal tax return, and the question was improper. Reluctantly, however, I have concluded that this error was also harmless. When Bilzerian took the stand, he was cross-examined about his personal tax returns and was able to provide an exculpatory explanation of pertinent events that blunted the impact of the redirect examination of Murphy. I respectfully dissent from the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 . I, of course, do not disagree with the general canon relied upon by my colleagues that criminal statutes may overlap and that, when they do, the government may choose to indict under one rather than another. I cannot agree, *1305 however, that, because criminal statutes may overlap, Section 1001 must overlap with Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act. The bottom line is Congressional intent. Another canon of construction thus dictates that courts must insure that every part of a statute be given meaning and not be rendered superfluous. See United, States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 , 75 S.Ct. 513, 519-20 , 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955). Because we have construed Section 101’s prohibition on false statements as not requiring a. finding of materiality, Section 32(a)’s prohibition on “false [statements] ... with respect to any material fact” is superfluous. My colleagues’ interpretation seems particularly questionable because the two provisions were the product of virtually simultaneous Congressional consideration and action and, at the time of passage, Section 1001 contained more stringent penalties. It certainly seems somewhat odd to me that Congress would pass Section 32(a), which specifically applies to filings required by the federal securities laws, and less than twelve days later render portions of it superfluous by passing a very general statute that required a lesser standard of proof and provided harsher penalties. With the exception of United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir.1978), the cases relied upon by my colleagues are from other circuits and involved false statements in ongoing investigations. Fields , moreover, does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited, because it deals only with the issue of materiality. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9481371. Public record. Not legal advice.