# United States v. Columbus Country Club

> Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · December 18, 1990 · 915 F.2d 877

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480865

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. COLUMBUS COUNTRY CLUB
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
- **Decided:** December 18, 1990
- **Citations:** 915 F.2d 877; 1990 WL 151335
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Mansmann
- **Judges:** Mansmann, Greenberg, Seitz
- **Cited by:** 55 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480865

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[u]nder general principles of statutory construction, one who claims the benefit of an exception from the prohibition of a statute has the burden of proving that his claim comes within the exception” (internal quotation omitted)
- concluding that a person who rents the same bungalow every summer, and who intends to return to it every summer, is not a “mere transient,” but rather a seasonal resident of a “dwelling” for purposes of the Federal Housing Act
- stating that the “religious organization” and “private club” exemptions in § 3607(a) are affirmative defenses

## Opinion text

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe that the panel majority, in construing the religious exemption from the Fair Housing Act, unduly minimizes significant connections between the Columbus Country Club and the Catholic Church. By insisting that a formal hierarchical relationship be established between the Church and the Club before the exemption may be invoked, the majority reaches a result which, in my view, was not anticipated by those drafting the Fair Housing Act. The narrow construction of the exemption has potentially significant implications for those wishing sincerely to live and associate in religious community.
It is important to note, at the outset, that this case is the first since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 to construe *886 the Act’s religious exemption provision. 1 This has not been a fertile ground for litigation and I believe that our analysis should reflect that fact, by being firmly grounded in the statutory language and the facts of this case.
I.
In order to assess the majority’s conclusions regarding the inapplicability of the religious exemption, I must detail the history and dimension of Columbus Country Club’s connection with the Roman Catholic Church. It is against this background that the statutory exemption must be evaluated.
The Columbus Country Club was organized in 1920 by the Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic men’s organization. In 1922, while members were still required to belong to the Knights of Columbus, title to the land was taken in the name of a separate non-profit corporation. In 1924, the Club was given its current name and, in 1936, the Club eliminated the requirement that members be affiliated with the Knights of Columbus; membership continued to be limited to Catholic males. 2
As the majority points out, the Club’s annual members are required to be members in good standing of the Roman Catholic Church. Prospective annual members are required to obtain the endorsement of an annual member and complete a one-page application form containing, among other things, the name of the prospective purchaser’s parish. The applicant must demonstrate that he or she, too, is a practicing Roman Catholic in good standing with his or her parish church; a statement to this effect from the parish priest must accompany the application. 3
The Club contends that, from its inception, religious expression has been an integral feature of the Club community. When the Club opened, the grounds were dedieat-ed in a special ceremony led by the organization’s spiritual director and two priests. During the period from 1920-1922, a special mass was celebrated each Sunday in the local parish for the benefit of Club members.
In 1922, and for the succeeding sixty-eight years, the Archbishop of Philadelphia has granted the Club special permission to have mass celebrated in a chapel on the Club grounds on each Sunday of the summer season. The Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia provides the Club with the services of a priest who celebrates the weekly mass and leads other special religious ceremonies observed by the Club members.
Family members meet in the chapel each summer evening to pray the rosary and a consecrated statue of the Blessed Mother stands in an area of the grounds known as the “grotto.” Both the chapel and the grotto are maintained by club members and the Sunday offering taken in the chapel is remitted to the local parish.
The affidavit of Reverend Richard J. Fleming, pastor of the parish in which the Club is located, was appended to the Club’s motion for summary judgment. That affidavit states that because Columbus Country Club, “a community of Roman Catholic families who live, pray, and worship together through the summer months ... is a Roman Catholic organization, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia provides it with the special privilege of celebrating mass on its grounds. This is a very rare and unusual privilege.” The affidavit also establishes that a parish priest celebrates mass at the Club on the Fourth of July and on August 15, a holy day of obligation. Club families take an active role in celebration of the Mass which, each week, is said in honor of the deceased members of a particular Club family.
*887 The same affidavit notes that the statue of the Blessed Mother on Club grounds was consecrated by a priest in a special ceremony for the benefit of Club families and the Club is in the process of applying for the special privilege of having the chapel named in honor of a woman soon to be canonized a saint.
Church doctrine recognizes the value of the assembly of a community of believers as an integral facet of the practice of Catholicism. Furthermore, the affidavit states that “the Roman Catholic church recognizes and approves of the assembly of a group of Roman Catholic families for a summer retreat of weekly worship and daily prayer together as a valuable and legitimate exercise of their religious beliefs.”
II.
Congress drafted the religious organization exemption broadly to apply to any “religious organization, association, or society or any non-profit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization....” 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (a) (1988). Given the use of the disjunctive form here, the Club argues that Congress intended that the statutory exemption apply to any non-profit organization that is “operated by” or “supervised by” or “controlled by” or “operated in conjunction with” or “controlled in conjunction with” a religious or-ganizátion. The district court found that, at the very least, the Club operated in conjunction with the Roman Catholic Church, and was, therefore, entitled to the Act’s religious exemption:
[Although, as a strictly legal proposition, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese does not actually “control” the club or its operations, it is clear that the persons who, over the years, have operated and controlled the club have do so “in conjunction with” their continuing obligations as members of the Roman Catholic faith. As a practical matter, by virtue of its ability to grant or withhold the privilege of holding services in the Club chapel — a privilege which is central to the traditional operations of the club— the Archdiocese does possess a very significant degree of control over the club itself.
United States v. Columbus Country Club, No. 87-8164, slip op. at 10-11 (E.D.Pa.1989).
The majority, evaluating all of the undisputed facts detailed above and the district court’s conclusion, concludes, surprisingly to me, that the Country Club has not carried the burden of establishing entitlement to the religious organization exemption. According to the majority, the words “in conjunction with” imply a “mutual relationship between a non-profit society and a religious organization. The existence of this relationship cannot depend solely on the activities of the non-profit organization nor be viewed only from its perspective.” Majority at 883. The majority concludes that “[wjithout further evidence of interaction or involvement by the Church, we cannot conclude that as a matter of law the Church controlled the defendant or that the defendant was operated ‘in conjunction with’ the Church.” Id.
This result is not compelled by the text of the exemption itself. The language of the exemption does not focus solely upon “control” or “mutuality” but describes a number of different types of relationships which serve to bring an organization within the terms of the exemption. The majority’s reliance on equivocal legislative history notwithstanding, I think it clear that the Columbus Country Club, under the terms of the statute itself, qualifies for the religious organization exemption. If Congress had meant to make control or mutuality the determinative evaluative criterion, it certainly would have expressed this intention more clearly. The exemption here must be interpreted at least as broadly as the common meaning of its text, rather than restricted to circumstances far more narrow than the meaning conveys. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-486 , 37 S.Ct. 192, 194-195 , 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)(words used in a statute are presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be used in their ordinary and usual sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.) The majority approach simply is *888 not supported by the plain language of the exemption.
III.
Even if a mutuality standard were clearly expressed in the text of the exemption, I would find that that standard has been met. In examining the history of Columbus Country Club and, the uncontroverted details of its connections to the Catholic church, I find it difficult to imagine what more the panel majority could want in terms of mutuality. The Club has operated to support the Church, both monetarily and by its members’ living and practicing the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith. The Church, in turn, has supported the Club, by participating in its founding, by providing prayer support and by making clergy available to the community where it does not do so in other cases; the Church’s provision of a priest to conduct services is central to the Club’s purpose and philosophy and, as the district court concluded, certainly provides the Church with a substantial measure of defacto control over Club operations. The Church has, in fact, exercised its influence over the Club in bringing it into compliance with the Church’s policy against sex discrimination.
Throughout this litigation, the government has taken the position, which the majority apparently accepts, that the Columbus Country Club is nothing more than a homeowner’s association whose “one link” to the Church — the weekly mass — is not sufficient to support exemption from the Fair Housing Act. In the government’s view — again tacitly adopted by the majority — the extremely narrow interpretation of the exemption’s phrase “in conjunction with” is appropriate. Otherwise, the argument goes, any group of persons holding the same religious beliefs could exclude others from their housing development simply by calling themselves a religious organization and arranging for a local church to hold certain services on the development’s grounds.
Where the legislative history underlying this exemption is, by the majority’s admission, scant, there is no guiding easelaw, and the wording of the exemption itself is quite broad, I think it inadvisable to read into the exemption a requirement of formality that is not clearly expressed. This is especially so given the first amendment implications of this case.
I conclude that the uncontroverted record does not support the conclusion that the Club is nothing more than a homeowner’s association bent on excluding non-Catholics. The religious dimension of this Club is substantial and does not, as the parties agree, represent a subterfuge to evade the requirements of the Fair Housing Act. The Club’s organization and religious character preceded enactment of the Fair Housing Act by more than 48 years and there is not the slightest indication of bad faith in the Club’s having limited its annual membership to those of the Catholic faith. Subjecting the Club to the Fair Housing Act will destroy its character as a religious community where like-minded individuals are able to support one another, communally express their beliefs and model their values to their children. I cannot believe that this was the kind of “wrong” which the Fair Housing Act was drafted to remedy. From a policy viewpoint, the conclusion reached by the majority here today may have far-reaching impact on groups such as church camps, retreats and other organizations through which individuals associate to practice their faith.
While another case, presenting different facts, may require another result, here I believe that the district court’s conclusion that the Club is exempt from allegations of religious discrimination under the Fair Housing Act is correct and should be affirmed.
ORDER SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Dec. 18, 1990.
PRESENT: HIGGINBOTHAM, Chief Judge, and SLOVITER, BECKER, STA-PLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NY-GAARD, ALITO, and SEITZ, Circuit Judges.
The petition for rehearing filed by appel-lee in the above captioned matter having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in the regular active service, and no judge who concurred in'the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not having voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied. Chief Judge Higginbotham and Judge Mansmann would grant rehearing by the court in banc for the reasons set forth in Judge Mansmann’s dissent. Judges Scirica, Nygaard and Alito would grant rehearing by the court in banc.
. While the panel majority cites United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F.Supp. 544, 550 (W.D.Va.1975) as having interpreted Title VIII's religious exemption, that court did not address the exemption substantively as it determined, initially, that the exemption was totally inapplicable to the facts presented.
. By an amendment to the bylaws made in 1987, women were permitted membership. The requirement that members be members of the Catholic faith was retained.
.The Club’s uncontroverted contention is that evidence of common interest in the religious activities of the Club and the parish priest’s attestation to the applicant’s good standing in that parish have always been membership requirements. While these requirements were always observed, they were not codified in the Club Bylaws until 1987.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480865. Public record. Not legal advice.