# South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Commission of Ohio

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · August 17, 1990 · 911 F.2d 1203

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480716

## Case

- **Full name:** SOUTH RIDGE BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 17, 1990
- **Citations:** 911 F.2d 1203; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14266; 1990 WL 117984
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wellford
- **Judges:** Wellford, Boggs, Engel
- **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480716

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Lee and upholding state requirement of mandatory participation in worker’s compensation program

## Opinion text

*1212 WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur with the reasoning and rationale of Judge Engel’s opinion. This is a close and troubling case with respect to whether there are any less “restrictive means” to provide workers’ compensation coverage for church-related employees than Ohio has taken. Plaintiff has demonstrated none in my view. It may be logical to assume, as argued by plaintiff, that the risk of injury in church-related jobs is less than in business and industry generally, but presumably the Ohio rate system gives a lower rate to those employers with fewer claims. It is a policy decision for the state to permit reasonable exemptions or exceptions from coverage.
Plaintiff has submitted affidavits that it operates a school or academy in conjunction with the church, which Robert B. Woodard, the school’s principal, has said is a part of “the Church’s day school ministry.” We do not know whether employees and teachers in this school are considered “church” employees, but Woodard also serves as a “pastor to the deaf.” Deborah Miller, another affiant, says she is a teacher in the academy, a church member, as well as a part of the church’s “county home ministry,” and has been a part of its “college ministry.” Ms. Miller says also that she is “a part of [the plaintiff church’s] staff.” We have reason, then, to believe that plaintiff operates with a staff larger than might be expected in the usual rural Ohio church.
Ohio’s Director of the Actuarial Department submitted an affidavit also indicating that the state has taken in some $39,000,-000 in premiums from the “classification that covers religious organizations such as churches” from 1982 to 1985. During that same period “the State incurred liability” of some $59,000,000 “in compensation and benefits to those injured workers of employers,” such as plaintiff. This data indicates a substantial deficit in premiums necessary to cover workers’ compensation benefits to church (and related entity) employees. This data demonstrates a strong need that all church employers be included among all other covered employers as premium payers to help with this deficit. (The system as a whole has accumulated a deficit exceeding one billion dollars as of December 31, 1985.)
In addition, Ohio does have a provision in its workers’ compensation laws that allows qualified employers to be self-insurers, thus avoiding some of the burdens of reporting to the state as covered employers. There is no indication that this particular church, nor that Christian churches as a class, has been treated differently under the Ohio law than other like employers or any other religious group. Plaintiff apparently did not choose to pursue this option.
I join, therefore, in affirming the district court decision.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480716. Public record. Not legal advice.
