# Norman Braley v. City of Pontiac, Stanley Helgemo, Sergeant Arthur Rouse and Roland Garcia, Officers

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · June 19, 1990 · 906 F.2d 220

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480470

## Case

- **Full name:** Norman BRALEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF PONTIAC, Defendant, Stanley Helgemo, Sergeant; Arthur Rouse and Roland Garcia, Officers, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 19, 1990
- **Citations:** 906 F.2d 220; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 9690; 1990 WL 81882
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Nelson
- **Judges:** Nelson, Boggs, Battisti
- **Cited by:** 363 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480470

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[s]ection 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
- stating that substantive due process violation can be a deprivation of a constitutional guarantee or can occur by actions of government officials that "shock the conscience"
- stating that “Section 1983 3 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
- stating that “Section 1983 does not itself 3 create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
- stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”

## Opinion text

DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of liberty *228 without due process of law. In a number of decisions, including Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.1985) (en banc), this court, like others, has recognized a distinction not apparent in the language of the Constitution: a distinction between “procedural” due process of law, which sounds redundant, and “substantive” due process of law, which sounds like a contradiction in terms.
I must take it as given that the Due Process Clause does in fact have what the Supreme Court calls a “substantive component,” see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), and that circumstances can exist in which a person might be found to have been deprived of liberty without “substantive due process of law.” But I am reluctant to try to come to grips with that “ephemeral concept,” as we called it in Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir.1988), absent a clear necessity for doing so. I see no such necessity here. I have no quarrel with the answer the court gives to the question of whether the defendant’s conduct “shocks the conscience,” however, and in all other respects I fully concur in the court's opinion.
District Judge BATTISTI joins in this concurrence.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480470. Public record. Not legal advice.
