# Marion J. Imel v. Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern California

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 22, 1990 · 904 F.2d 1327

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480409

## Case

- **Full name:** Marion J. IMEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LABORERS PENSION TRUST FUND FOR NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** May 22, 1990
- **Citations:** 904 F.2d 1327; 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1680; 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2313; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8168; 1990 WL 66174
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Trott
- **Judges:** Choy, Thompson, Trott
- **Cited by:** 15 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480409

## Opinion text

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority opinion reaches its result by effectively stretching the word and the concept “employer” beyond all recognition, giving it new meaning that no ordinary person could possibly anticipate or comprehend. All of a sudden, “employer” includes possibly an industry as a whole, a trust fund, or a union of which Mr. Imel was a member but for which he never worked. Unions in this circuit, as the Fund in this case, will certainly be surprised to discover that their members may be really their employees for certain purposes, and they will be more than interested to discover that they may have unexpected financial responsibilities for which no provisions *1335 have been made. I find the Second Circuit’s answer to the “Alice in Wonderland” indictment of this type of abuse of the English language and the plain meaning of words to be unpersuasive. We construe statutes, yes, but we do not redefine words, especially when the redefinition carries important policy implications with it. That is up to the people who write dictionaries or Congress — not judges. The majority opinion calls this a “liberal construction” of the key word and the statute: I respectfully see it as verbal anarchy.
The majority opinion rewrites the law to achieve a desirable result. What it says is that as a matter of policy, Mr. Imel and people similarly situated should also receive the benefits of the Veteran’s Readjustment Act. Maybe so, but if we are to respect the concept of separation of powers and the prerogative of the legislature, that call should be made by Congress. What we believe Congress would have done if they had confronted this policy issue is irrelevant. This is not a case where we are called on to iron out fuzzy language. What is at stake is what the judiciary sees as the limits of its authority.
The Fund argues with vigor that what the majority does creates a huge financial burden on the Fund for which no provisions have been made. The majority opinion waves this off as an “economic argument.” I see it as something a legislature would want to consider seriously.
Were I a member of Congress, I might find myself very sympathetic to the majority’s policy reasons for wanting to include people like Mr. Imel within the scope of this Act. But as a judge, I must regrettably tell him he is in the wrong forum.
I would dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 2022 .
I dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9480409. Public record. Not legal advice.