# United States v. Charles Gilbert Hardy and Buddy Huffman, Jr.

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · November 4, 1988 · 855 F.2d 753

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9478086

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Gilbert HARDY and Buddy Huffman, Jr., Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** November 4, 1988
- **Citations:** 855 F.2d 753
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hill
- **Judges:** Hill, Kravitch, Tuttle
- **Cited by:** 116 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9478086

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding reasonable suspicion based on conflicting stories and the fact that occupants who claimed to be friends on a fishing trip did not know each others’ last names or other basic information
- stating that a fifty-minute traffic stop, by itself, did not invalidate the detention, but demonstrating “some unease” about the detention’s length
- affirming denial of suppression motion and noting that fifteen minutes of questioning regarding travel plans and travel history prior to running computer check was part of investigation of the traffic violation
- noting that had officer driven detainees to restaurant to wait until drug dog was available to come to stop location, “he might well have converted the Terry stop into an arrest requiring probable cause”
- finding that a fifty minute investigatory stop was a Terry investigative detention

## Opinion text

HILL, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I do not fully agree with everything which is intimated by the majority in Part II of its opinion. Whether “Operation Nighthawk” was in effect or influenced Trooper Ralston has no bearing on this case. Ralston observed the speeding *762 Town Car and made an entirely legal and constitutional stop because of its violation of a Georgia traffic law. Just because an officer is pleased that a suspicious car violates traffic laws so that a stop is justified does not make the stop unconstitutional. One who violates traffic laws is not, because he appears to be a drug courier, immunized from arrest. 1
Moreover, if Georgia wants to use its highway patrol for no other purpose than to apprehend drug couriers, that is all right as long as it is done constitutionally. As noted in footnote 6 of the majority opinion, state troopers “shall ... investigate violations of the criminal laws of this state.” O.C.G.A. § 35-2-32(b).
I agree with the sentence on page 17 of the majority opinion that the duration of the stop is the only troubling circumstance in this case. However, as the majority explains, in view of the other aspects of the stop demonstrating that the police acted with propriety, the duration of the stop alone does not violate the Constitution.
. To the extent United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc) requires that a police officer have a "proper" motive as well as probable cause when stopping a car, I would suggest abandoning that position as the Fifth Circuit did in United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 , 1987 WL 23 ,392 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc). As the Causey court noted, “so long as police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.” Id. at 1184.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9478086. Public record. Not legal advice.