# Frances B. Smith v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, a Body Politic

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · July 22, 1988 · 853 F.2d 517

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9478010

## Case

- **Full name:** Frances B. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, a Body Politic, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** July 22, 1988
- **Citations:** 853 F.2d 517; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 10808; 1988 WL 82203
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cudahy
- **Judges:** Bauer, Cudahy, Coffey
- **Cited by:** 20 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9478010

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding no property interest where personnel clerk employed by school board, who did not have the authority to bind the school board to a contract, told the employee she was a “certified” employee entitled to certain protections

## Opinion text

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree that the majority reaches the correct result through an analysis that responds to the somewhat unusual and opaque arguments of the parties. That this is a procedural due process case requiring the existence of a property interest seems clear. That we are dealing with a problem in substantive due process seems much less clear, although the plaintiff must, in any event, lose under a substantive due process analysis. The equal protection claim perhaps offers more promise than the others because of the apparent disparity in the treatment of “rapid advanc-ers” and those who linger to serve their required probation. This does not, however, seem to be quite the argument that the plaintiff makes.
Smith was the holder of what amounts to a “battlefield commission.” She advanced through the ranks so rapidly that she was never left in one place long enough to complete a probationary period. Under the rules she points to no deprivation which can be deemed of constitutional dimension. But the rules, even if constitutional in their application, seem clearly deficient in allowing this bizarre scenario to unfold. It is certainly not evident why, with each promotion, an employee receives no credit for probationary time already served, to be applied to some lower classification level.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9478010. Public record. Not legal advice.