# Stephen Marozsan v. The United States of America and the Veterans' Administration, Defendants

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · July 25, 1988 · 852 F.2d 1469

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477990

## Case

- **Full name:** Stephen MAROZSAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the UNITED STATES of America and the Veterans’ Administration, Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** July 25, 1988
- **Citations:** 852 F.2d 1469; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 10702; 1988 WL 79781
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Posner
- **Judges:** Bauer, Cummings, Wood, Cudahy, Posner, Coffey, Flaum, Easterbrook, Ripple, Maníon, Kanne
- **Cited by:** 58 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477990

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[t]he terror of extreme 16 hypotheticals produces much bad law”
- stating that “[t]he terror of extreme hypotheticals produces much bad law”
- explaining Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389

## Opinion text

POSNER, Circuit Judge,
with whom CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring in the opinion and judgment of the court.
I agree with the majority’s interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a), and shall note some *1480 reasons why in a moment, but first I want to point out that there is an argument for avoiding the interpretive question on the ground that the case is outside the jurisdiction of the district court even if section 211(a) is not a bar to that jurisdiction. Suppose Marozsan was entitled to have the district court review the denial of his claim to veterans’ benefits to the extent necessary to determine whether his constitutional rights had been violated; then if he proved such a violation he would be entitled to an order directing the Veterans’ Administration to give him a new hearing. But he did not ask for a new hearing — only for $5 million in damages and an order granting him the amount of veterans’ benefits that he claims. He is emphatic about the nature of the relief he is seeking. (And he has been represented by counsel throughout this proceeding.) As stated in one of his briefs in the district court, “the Plaintiff does not seek judicial review of the decision rendered in his own particular VA claim action_” His original complaint makes passing reference to an injunction; his amended complaint does not.
The claim for damages is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(2), which, with immaterial exceptions, denies federal district courts jurisdiction over claims against the United States in excess of $10,000. See, e.g., Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 586-88 (3d Cir.1985). Such claims must be filed in the Claims Court instead. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 . As for Marozsan’s claim to benefits, proof of a denial of due process would entitle him not to a federal court order granting him benefits but merely to an order that the Veterans’ Administration give him a new hearing. For even if the Veterans’ Administration processed his claim in a manner that denied him due process of law, it would not follow that his claim was a good one under the Veterans’ Benefits Act. Only the Veterans’ Administration can make that determination; this much section 211(a) makes clear.
Although Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings,” this provision was not intended to empower courts to force unwanted relief upon a party. See 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2662, at pp. 132-33 (2d ed. 1983). Nor does it entitle a plaintiff to circumvent jurisdictional limitations, as by bringing a diversity suit for less than $10,-000 and arguing that, should the evidence show that he is entitled to more, Rule 54(c) will allow the court to award more. Nevertheless, giving Marozsan the benefit of the doubt and bearing in mind that he wants benefits and can get them only by first obtaining a new hearing before the Veterans’ Administration, I conclude that his complaint should be interpreted as asking that the Veterans’ Administration be ordered to give him a new hearing. See Hahn v. United States, supra, 757 F.2d at 587 ; Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 816 F.2d 796, 800 (1st Cir.1987), aff’d, Bowen v. Massachusetts, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2722 , 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988).
This mode of relief, prospective in character, would not involve a money judgment against the United States, and is, I believe, within the power of the district court. That would be clear enough if section 211(a) did not exist. Although no statute explicitly authorizes judicial review of decisions by the Veterans’ Administration denying applications for benefits, ordinarily when a government agency makes a decision alleged to violate the Constitution or laws of the United States and Congress has failed to specify the method for obtaining judicial review of the decision, a person harmed by the decision can bring suit in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to set the decision aside. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 704 ; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 , 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511 , 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); General Finance Corp. v. FTC, 700 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir.1983). If Marozsan can prove his constitutional claim, the decision of the Veterans’ Administration denying his application for benefits will be set aside and the Administration directed to reconsider the ap *1481 plication using constitutionally permissible procedures.
For reasons more fully explained in the majority opinion, I do not think 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a) bars judicial relief as limited as that just described even though the statute provides that “the decision of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’, Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive.” Traynor v. Turnage, - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1372 , 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988), seems dispositive. The plaintiffs, like Marozsan, had asked the Veterans’ Administration for disability benefits. The Administration turned the plaintiffs down in reliance on one of its regulations, and they sought judicial review of the Administration’s action in federal district court, contending that the regulation on which the Administration had relied violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 . The Supreme Court held that section 211(a) was not a bar to judicial review. It emphasized the distinction between “decisions made in interpreting or applying a particular provision of [the Veterans’ Benefits Act] to a particular set of facts,” and decisions on whether the Act (or its interpretation by the Veterans’ Administration) is valid in light of another law, such as the Rehabilitation Act or the Constitution, “whose enforcement is not the exclusive domain of the Veterans’ Administration.” 108 S.Ct. at 1379 (footnote omitted). That distinction implies that judicial review is permitted' in the present case as well. It would be strange if a regulation of the Veterans’ Administration alleged to violate the Rehabilitation Act could be challenged in federal court notwithstanding the supposedly clear words of section 211(a) but practices of the Administration alleged to violate the Constitution could not be. That would imply that if the Veterans’ Administration adopts a regulation fixing a quota of successful administrative appeals from denials of benefits the regulation can be challenged in court, but if the identical quota is established and followed as a matter of informal practice (as Marozsan charges) it is immune from judicial review. Such a distinction would not promote compliance with the Constitution; it would merely encourage the Veterans’ Administration to avoid codifying unconstitutional practices.
The fact that a regulation was involved in Traynor provides no basis for regarding the suit (actually suits) in that case as somehow independent of the Veterans’ Benefits Act in a way that the present suit is not. In both that case and this one the plaintiffs are- persons seeking veterans’ benefits. -If they were not, they would have no standing to challenge the conduct of the Veterans’ Administration. If someone who wants benefits necessarily makes a claim under the Veterans’ Benefits Act and not under the statute or constitutional provision that he contends the Veterans’ Administration is violating, Traynor was decided incorrectly; for Traynor was such a person, just like Marozsan.
In light of Traynor the government can get little mileage from decisions in which the Supreme Court has enforced statutes that close the doors of the federal courts to persons with money claims against the federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 668 , 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). The question is whether and in precisely what sense section 211(a) is such a statute. Certainly Maroz-san cannot obtain a money judgment from the United States by demonstrating that the Veterans’ Administration committed a legal or factual error in denying his claim for benefits. But Traynor suggests that he can obtain a judgment enjoining the Administration from processing his claim under procedures that violate the Constitution, and directing the Administration to give him a new hearing under constitutional procedures. To that extent the doors to the federal courts remain ajar.
Though it hardly matters at our level, I think Traynor was decided correctly and that section 211(a) does not foreclose judicial review of actions by the Veterans’ Administration that are alleged to violate laws other than the Veterans’.Benefits Act itself. Of course this does not mean that 5 U.S.C. § 702 , which authorizes judicial re *1482 view of federal agency action except where forbidden by statute, unravels section 211(a) and allows decisions by the Veterans' Administration to be challenged even when they are challenged solely for nonconformity with the Veterans’ Benefits Act. It could mean judicial review of decisions alleged to violate the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that govern administrative proceedings, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 554 , but it appears that the Veterans’ Administration is not subject to those provisions. Cf. Colorado v. Veterans Administration, 602 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir.1979).
The issue of judicial review in Traynor and the present case is a textbook illustration of the deficiencies of literalism as a style of statutory interpretation. The idea that semantically unambiguous sentences —sentences clear “on their face” — sentences whose meaning is “plain” — can be interpreted without reference to purpose inferred from context is fallacious. Take that clearest of directives: “Keep off the grass.” Read literally it forbids the groundskeeper to mow the grass. No one would read it literally. Read literally, 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a) would preclude judicial review of any decision by the Veterans’ Administration, yet this would result in placing beyond judicial review a decision by the Administration not to hire blacks, Lutherans, or socialists, provided the Administration based the decision on a “law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors.” For as I read the statute, the decision need not provide benefits, only the law on which the decision is based; if the only decisions encompassed by section 211(a) were decisions providing benefits, the statute would have no application to this case, which involves a denial of benefits.
Even a reading that barred judicial review of any decision that denied, for whatever reason, a claim for veterans' benefits —the reading urged by the government— would have extreme consequences that Congress almost certainly did not intend: it would insulate from judicial review a denial of benefits that was based on the veteran’s race or political beliefs. The veteran would have no legal remedy of any kind, since a suit against the officials who had denied his claim (in contrast to a suit against an official who had made a nonadjudicative decision, such as a decision to hire or fire an employee of the agency, see Forrester v. White, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 538 , 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988), or had issued a general policy directive to the adjudicators) would be barred by the absolute immunity of adjudicators. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).
The government acknowledges that there is no purchase in the language or history of the statute for a distinction between procedural and substantive constitutional claims. (And such a distinction, if drawn, would only show that section 211(a) cannot be read literally.) The distinction lacks even intuitive appeal unless one contrasts a strong substantive claim with a weak procedural one — admittedly a comparison that Marozsan’s threadbare complaint invites. Compare instead a contention that a difference in the level of veterans’ benefits based on whether the veteran participated in a declared war rather than in an undeclared war is arbitrary, and hence a denial of equal protection (which has been read back from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment), with a contention that the Veterans’ Administration denies a veteran due process of law by submitting his claim to trial by Ouija board or Tarot pack. It would be arbitrary to suggest that the first contention could ground a federal court suit but not the second. The only principled ground for a decision in favor of the government in this case would be that the judicial correction of unconstitutional denials of veterans’ benefit claims is forbidden no matter what the nature of the constitutional infirmity.
A reading of section 211(a) that immunized the decisions of the Veterans’ Administration from judicial review based on allegations of racial, religious, or sexual discrimination, or infringement of freedom of speech, would be implausible. I know that section 211(a) was not enacted yesterday. *1483 But I find it hard to imagine that in 1970, when it was last amended, or even in 1933, when it was first enacted, a majority of Congress, with the concurrence of the President, would have agreed to extinguish all constitutional remedies against the Veterans’ Administration that veterans might otherwise possess, or might acquire by virtue of subsequent enactments. The question is not whether Congress in 1933 or 1970 conferred any such remedies but whether it meant to forever preclude all such remedies even if the result would someday be a bizarre discrepancy between the constitutional position of veterans and that of other citizens. If the statute were as clear as the government believes, we could interpret it without speculating about how Congress would have answered a question not actually presented to it. But if the statute were that clear, one would have expected Traynor — a suit based merely on the Rehabilitation Act,' and not on the Constitution — to be decided in favor of the government.
The fact that Marozsan’s suit is based on the Constitution assumes additional significance in light of Webster v. Doe, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2047 , 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), decided even more recently than Traynor . Doe had been fired by the CIA for being a homosexual, and he brought suit against the Agency on a variety of constitutional grounds. The Agency argued that judicial review of Doe’s dismissal was barred by section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, which provides that the Director of Central Intelligence “may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 403 (c). The Supreme Court held that this provision foreclosed judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, but not under the Constitution: “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.... Nothing in § 102(c) persuades us that Congress meant to preclude consideration of colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Director pursuant to that section; we believe that a constitutional claim based on an individual discharge may be reviewed by the District Court.” — U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 2054 (footnote omitted). Similarly, nothing in 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a) reflects a specific intent to preclude constitutional review of the denial of veterans’ ' benefits — and without this “heightened showing” of legislative intent, a showing that the Court requires “in part to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim,” constitutional review is not precluded. At -, 108 S.Ct. at 2053.
It is natural to be concerned lest the federal courts be inundated with run-of-the-mine procedural challenges dressed up. as constitutional claims. Marozsan’s suit may illustrate that danger, and it is not one to be taken lightly in an age of staggering federal judicial caseloads. However, federal courts are not only empowered but directed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to levy sanctions on persons, who file frivolous suits. If the frivolousness of the suit is apparent from the pleadings, the suit does not even invoke federal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 , 53 S.Ct. 549 , 77 L.Ed. 1062 (1933); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38 , 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1379 , 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276-77 , (7th Cir.1988). This circuit has been in the forefront of judicial efforts to enforce Rule 11 vigorously. The rule contains no exception for veterans.
We should not take the weakness of Mar-ozsan’s suit as proof that all due process challenges by disappointed claimants for veterans’ benefits must be laughable. And as between a reading of the statute that would allow judicial review for the correction of substantive but not procedural violations of the Constitution and one that allows judicial review for the correction of either type of violation, the former would not only be arbitrary but also more difficult to square with the statute’s language and purpose. The statute confers finality *1484 on decisions by the Veterans’ Administration “on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits.” In other words, you cannot bring suit to overturn its decision on the ground that the decision violates or misapplies the Veterans’ Benefits Act. But you can bring suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to set aside the decision on the ground that it violates the Constitution. The district court has no power to award damages or even benefits in such a suit but only to tell the Veterans’ Administration to reconsider its decision, this time in accordance with the Constitution. The supremacy of the Veterans’ Administration in determining the facts and law relating to the veteran’s claim is unimpaired by such an approach, and Rule 11 should deter disappointed claimants from attempting to transmute ordinary procedural challenges into constitutional ones.
Judicial review is no panacea. Maybe, because of the strength of the veterans’ lobby or other reasons, the Veterans’ Administration can be trusted always to obey the Constitution without judicial prodding, and if not, maybe the costs of such prodding will exceed the benefits. It might be best to leave the Veterans' Administration completely alone, and section 211(a) could be read as doing just that. But such a reading would be policy-based rather than dictated by “plain meaning,” would be inconsistent with Traynor and Webster , would run counter to the strong modern trend (judicial as well as legislative) toward providing judicial remedies for constitutional violations, and would impute to Congress the implausible purpose of denying any legal remedy to veterans wronged as a result of constitutional violations — however egregious — committed by the very agency established to help veterans.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477990. Public record. Not legal advice.